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
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THE UNITED STATES SOLDIER IN A NONVIOLENT ROLE (AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW)

by

Virgil Ney

July 1967



Prepared by
TECHNICAL OPERATIONS INCORPORATED
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for
HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS COMMAND
FORT BELVOIR, VIRGINIA

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ABSTRACT

Throughout our Nation's history, the United States Army has engaged in numerous wars, both large and small. In all these conflicts the Army has operated under certain circumstances in a nonviolent manner. These instances show how the military professional often converts his military training and skills to purposes other than the delivery of violence. Essentially, nonviolent military activities center about the techniques of engineering, road construction, disaster relief, mass feeding, housing, medical aid, and the institution of health measures and sanitation facilities. The re-establishment of local government, and the maintenance of law and order also come within the scope of nonmilitary activities that may be operated by a military command.

FOREWORD

This memorandum is part of a larger CORG study effort, that resulted in six reports. The first report, CORG-M-293, US Army Socio-Political Education Requirements for Internal Defense and Internal Development Operations, contains the main portions of the investigative effort, including the discussion of the problem, conclusions and recommendations. The other five reports, including this report, are supporting documents. The Russian and Chinese Communist military educational systems for political instruction are described in CORG-M-312, Political Education in the Army of the Soviet Union and CORG-M-313, Political Education in the Army of Communist China. A lesser known system of political instruction within a military structure is covered in CORG-M-314, Political Indoctrination in the Wehrmacht. The history, theory, fallacies, and practice of communism are covered in CORG-M-311, Communism in Review.

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Illustrations by CORG Art Staff

SUMMARY

In ancient days, the Roman legion, a fighting force of 6,000 men, established basic patterns of nonviolent ex-officio activity. The constructive value of the legion was reflected in the roads built, cities located, and waterways provided--all as fringe benefits of its being stationed in a particular area. The Roman legionnaire was a first-class fighting man but he was also a builder of roads and walled cities. These tangible achievements were coincidental with his campaigning but they remained in use long after the legion had departed to other fields of conquest and achievement.

In modern times, the management of violence has become, because of necessity, a profession that engages men on a full-time basis. Thus, there has evolved, in almost every civilized nation, the professional soldier, whose special mission it is to manage warfare and matters appertaining thereto.

That an officer could be other than a leader of men in battle was not considered seriously by those engaged in the military profession until the twentieth century. Obviously, certain skills of the artilleryist and the engineer were of value in civil occupations but there was little or no requirement for the skill of battle leadership in times of peace. However, the skill of the battle planner or commander could often be turned to the management of large groups of workers, either in industry or in agriculture. Further, conversion of the leadership factor was noted in the entrance of former professional officers in the political arena, where the strategy and tactics were somewhat analogous to those of warfare.

Since its establishment in 1802, the United States Military Academy has provided education and military training to fit young Americans to become professional officers in the Regular Army. Initially, patterned after contemporary European military academies, West Point was operated, for the first one hundred and fifty years, as an engineering school by the Army Corps of Engineers. While graduated cadets were trained academically and scientifically in accordance with contemporary knowledge, they were essentially trained to be commanders, managers, and controllers of violence in the prosecution of warfare.

Throughout our Nation's history, the United States Army has engaged in numerous wars, both large and small. In all these conflicts, the Army has operated under certain circumstances in a nonviolent manner. These instances show how the military professional often converts his military training and skills to purposes other than the delivery of violence. Essentially, nonviolent military activities center about the techniques of mass feeding, housing, medical relief, and the re-establishment of health and sanitation facilities. The re-establishment of local government, law, and order also come within the scope of non-military activities that may be operated by a military command.

Throughout its history, the United States Armies have performed primitive or sophisticated civic actions in the interest of humanity and the accomplishment of the military mission. The advent of insurgency as a tactic of the Cold War added a new dimension to the art of war that must be understood and mastered by the modern US Army officer and soldier. The military man of today must know how to wage violent warfare, and must also know how to employ civic action as a primary counterinsurgency weapon.

THE UNITED STATES SOLDIER IN A NONVIOLENT ROLE (AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW)

INTRODUCTION

...the military professional is disciplined, inflexible, and, in a sense, unequipped for political compromise. In this view, since the perspectives of men are fashioned by their daily tasks, the life of the military professional produces a pattern of mental traits which are blunt, direct, and uncompromising. The military establishment is seen as an institution in which debate is no more at a premium than persuasion; one obeys and one commands. This may have been the environment of the military organization, where sheer size and technical complexity require elaborate procedures to insure coordination (Ref 13).

Traditionally, the soldier has existed for the purpose of the delivery of violence upon an enemy and his installations. The express mission of this delivery has been controlled and directed injury, death, and destruction serious enough to induce the enemy to surrender. From the most ancient times to the twentieth century, the primary task of the soldier has been to deliver this violence. The forms which the violence took were at first simple and primitive, and often muscular. However, man discovered hidden natural forces, such as gunpowder, which could amplify and extend his muscular power. These new forces and the complexities of weapons which employed them made a distinct profession out of the trade of war (Ref 1).

The ability of soldiers to hurl missiles upon the enemy by other than muscular means caused warfare to become less direct and more impersonal. The explosive power of gunpowder increased the lethality of military operations. From the beginning of warfare, tactics (or the art of maneuver of troops on the battlefield) were centered about the characteristics and killing power of contemporary weapons. Primarily, the military profession became one of understanding how to maneuver troops and weapons to deliver their maximum destructive power upon the enemy. The formula for success in land combat was found in the terms "fire" and "movement." To implement the formula in battle, the military commander possessed the combined arms of infantry, cavalry, and artillery (Ref 2).

The theories of warfare promulgated by General Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831) were among the first to establish that there was a nonviolent, or political aspect of war. But the theory of Clausewitz, that warfare was

politics carried on by other means, while widely read, did not immediately gain mass acceptance. The military, faced with a life and death struggle in the field, were not about to discard tried and proven tools of war. Although they were the means of causing violent death and destruction, weapons were wielded in the national interest by the soldier. Often, the survival of his nation, his family, his home, and himself required and demanded that the citizen bear arms, voluntarily or involuntarily, to defeat the enemy of the state. The waging of warfare between nations has always been the usual and acceptable method of settling international disputes and differences (Ref 3).

Thus, the soldier became a technician in the delivery of violence in the interests of national and self-preservation. In essence, his basic personal philosophy of combat was "kill or get killed." To this end, his education and training were directed and dedicated. Indeed, as weapons improved and tactics were adjusted to them, the prosecution of war became more impersonal and indirect. Organizational teamwork based upon the strictest discipline and obedience became essential for the operation of military units. From the beginning, the military profession required absolute submission of the individual and units to the order and will of higher authority. This feature of military life made the soldier unique when compared to the average citizen with his comparative lack of restraint. In view of this uniqueness, the mind and the body of the soldier were educated and trained to give instant obedience to the order of a superior. Obedience of its members to the lawful orders of their superiors is a prime requisite for effective membership in the military profession.

That the professional soldier functions in areas other than the combat for which he is trained is noted historically from the time of the Roman Legions. Road builders and engineers, the Roman legionnaires improved the countryside wherever they were stationed. These improvements were directly connected with the military necessity of communication and transport but they were often strictly nonmilitary in character. This activity was not considered "civic action" as we know it today, but it served the same end for the inhabitants of the Roman-occupied areas. The Roman Legion had a train of joiners, masons, carpenters, smiths, painters, and workmen of every kind for the constructing of barracks in the winter camps, and for making or repairing wooden towers, arms, carriages, and various machines and engines for the attack or defense of places (Ref 4, p 49). In the military units of today, the soldier possesses the organization, leadership, supplies, and above, all professional competence in innumerable noncombat-related skills required for the rendering of nonmilitary services.

Armies have always possessed capabilities other than those associated with the profession of arms. In the occupation of conquered territories, the Army officer, regardless of his time in history, has been faced with problems of civil government. This type of nonmilitary activity extends from the highest level of political control to the administration of local law and order on the village level of a defeated or occupied nation. It follows then, that Army officers must take on additional duties in the

arenas of government and politics, inasmuch as there is no one else present to so function. Therefore, it will be noted that the Army officer must possess other skills and traits (Ref 5).

Tactical proficiency, that is, the management of men and weapons in battle, and individual technical and group proficiency in the operation of weapons, is the basic requirement of the military profession. The formal academic education of officers is accomplished traditionally at cadet schools. These institutions, especially in Europe, were patterned after the Kadetten Schulen established at Potsdam by Frederick the Great for the military education of the sons of the Prussian Junkers. Similar schools were founded in France and England; in 1802 the United States Military Academy was established at West Point, New York (see Fig 1), a Revolutionary War post which commanded the Hudson River (Ref 6).

The basic purpose of the course at any military academy is to prepare young men for the career responsibilities of military command and leadership. The disciplining of the mind toward deductive, logical reasoning is the primary objective of the curriculum regardless of the military character of the institution. The soldier carries out the policy of his nation, as directed. In the nineteenth century, there was no "gentle persuasion" technique of changing the enemy's attitude; it was to be accomplished by highly controlled and organized force, strong enough to make the enemy retreat or throw down his arms and surrender (Ref 7).

Because of the precise, logical decisions required of the officer on the field of battle, the academic discipline of mathematics has historically been the core of any military academy curriculum. Further, artillery science and field engineering demand a thorough grounding in mathematics. Formations, tactics, frontages, rates of march, and location of bivouacs and outposts are all geared to mathematical formulae. Troops were trained to react to the word of command as automatons. In the nineteenth century army there was little leeway for imagination and creativity on the part of the subordinate commander; tradition, and administrative and tactical patterns established by rigid regulations, prescribed his every move in garrison and in the field (Ref 8). These restrictions imposed upon the military leader did not contribute toward a broad outlook upon nonmilitary affairs. To the officer and the long-term soldier, the Army was a way of life. The officer was educated to be a decision-maker who could function under the stress and strain of combat command. Historically, his need for the humanities and cultural studies to prepare him for this role was thought to be minimal. Foreign languages were deemed essential to give him the ability to read and understand the technical works and military classics of other nations. His understanding of the cultural patterns and mores of other nations was practically nil. In fact, his understanding was limited usually to knowledge of their military capabilities and the geographical features of their terrain, which he generally learned from first-hand experience on the battlefield or, in modern times, in the staff college class room; the political situation of the enemy did not interest him. The cultural values




Figure 1. West Point - Where United States Army Officers Have Been Trained Since 1802

of the enemy were of little immediate consequence to the soldier whose task it was to fire the musket, or plunge the bayonet, or wield the saber. Understandably, the professional soldier was unaccustomed to use other than the traditional tools of his trade to accomplish his mission (Ref 9).

Historically, the soldier was equipped with a set of tools -- lethal weapons to carry out his particular mission. His formal education was, in the case of the officer, given solely for the purpose of enabling him to become skillful in the management of the delivery of violence. For the soldier, his training served to make him proficient in the technical operation of his weapon. In essence, for the officer, war was an art, a science, and a profession. For the men in the ranks, who were the operators of the weapons, war was a trade (Ref 10).

The advent of the Cold War and its concomitant insurgencies and limited wars presented the military profession with an enigma. The use of the spoken and printed word as a nonviolent weapon of warfare became more general as mass communication media came into common usage. Since World War II, warfare has been categorized into three broad, basic types: conventional, unconventional, and nuclear. The international situation and the possibility of a nuclear holocaust act as deterrents to the traditional military solution to many of the world's political problems. Often, the military profession finds itself obliged to carry out its innumerable missions with nonlethal tools, that is, propaganda and persuasion or civic action and welfare programs.

The evolutionary process has exerted a significant effect upon the military profession in the United States. The appearance of new weapons and new tactics and techniques of warfare has changed the concept of the military professional and his primary mission. Military education and training have been required to keep pace with the times. No longer is the officer of the Army exclusively a manager or director of violence. The political factors and tactics of the Cold War have dictated that the military professional be able to utilize nonviolent activities as weapons against insurgency and revolution. In the United States Army of today, the officer, noncommissioned officer, and private must be professionally versatile. No longer is the mastery of the techniques of the delivery of violence enough to qualify an individual as a military professional. Ability to operate in the nonviolent activities associated with the profession of arms is a basic requirement for the soldier of the present and future.

Historically, the officers and men of the United States Army have performed innumerable nonviolent and nonmilitary tasks and missions. However, their performance of these unusual duties was predicated not upon their professional and academic education and training, but rather upon their natural inclinations, abilities, and inherent talents. In essence, they possessed the understanding, motivation, and flexibility to operate successfully in other areas of human activity than those for which they had been specifically educated. In the past, these individuals were often considered as singular and unusual by others within the military profession. Basically

these skills, possessed by a limited number of officers and men, were considered to be fringe benefits to be employed by the military when required. When not needed, they were to be hidden away and brought forth only when needed.

The military profession, in the past, has made no particular effort to educate or train its personnel in nonviolent military operations, except in medical and engineering areas that were still basically identified with the waging of combat. Sanitation, health measures, good roads, and bridges all contributed to the welfare and efficiency of the troops, but they also contributed to the well-being of the civilian community where the troops found themselves. Military government, an activity concomitant to combat, required military professionals who possessed the ability to perform non-violent military duty.

Since World War II, the United States Military Academy has made great changes in its curriculum. The hard core scientific, technical education of the military professional has undergone considerable modification. The social sciences and humanities have been incorporated in the West Point cadet's educational pattern. The trend is toward the production of a graduate who can control and manage violence when needed but who can also manage nonviolent military activities in the national interest. Economics, sociology, psychology, and political science have all been added to the Military Academy curriculum for the express purpose of giving the cadet a well-rounded educational base. Many of the above disciplines are used as weapons against Cold War insurgencies. Modern war no longer requires that the professional officer be just a technical generalist; it requires, instead, that he be a technical specialist with a broad intercultural outlook (Ref 11 and Ref 12).

For a brief, but somewhat detailed, account of the United States Army's historic role in the fields of engineering, river and harbor and canal construction, and disaster relief see DA Pamphlet 360-217, The Army in Peacetime, Troop Topics, November 1964.

MILITARY EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES

The first requirement of the modern soldier, as in any profession, is technical proficiency. The army officer must know the army's organization, weapons, methods of fighting, and doctrine. But he must also know more. The modern officer is called upon to consult and work with foreign affairs experts, industrial managers, scientists, labor leaders, and educators. He helps prepare legislation, the national budget, and the American position on foreign policy issues. He must be able to understand and communicate with politicians and civilian specialists, both at home and in friendly foreign nations. He has to be able to evaluate the capabilities and probable reactions of potential enemies (Ref 7).

The professional educational system of the United States Army began with the establishment of the United States Military Academy in 1802 to prepare young men to become career Army officers. West Point was strictly an undergraduate school -- the early graduates continued learning when they performed their troop duties in eastern garrisons or on the western frontier.

Since Thayer's time, when the Academy was strictly a technical school, the curriculum of West Point has been broadened and balanced through several stages by the addition of "cultural" courses designed to round out the cadets' education within the limits of the institution's primary purpose of preparing men for military careers (Ref 14, pp 84-85).

After the close of the Civil War, the United States Army was reorganized and continued upon its basic mission of patrolling the Western Plains and when necessary fighting Indians. There was little educational effort on the part of the military professional other than in the fields of his primary duties, the tactical deployment of men and weapons. The pressure against the Indian as white population moved Westward toward the frontier caused the Red man to fight back for his land and his game preserves. The Army was usually given the unpleasant task of moving the Indian or compelling him to move. Threat of force and actual delivery of the force required occupied the bulk of the Regular Army's time (Ref 15, p 159).

In the Army's training during this period of history there was little provision for other than operation of the conventional tools of the military profession. Little thought was devoted to the creation of a governmental policy that would be satisfactory to both sides, that is, the Whites and the Indians. The only solution brought forth was to confine the tribes to reservations, making them unwilling wards of the United States. Under the threat of armed force they were kept there (Ref 16).

Historically, the classical education of the military professional was pointed toward the goal of giving him the educational background considered standard equipment for the "gentleman" of the period of history concerned. The fact that his profession was mainly centered about the management of violence bore little relationship to the curriculum that was planned to create out of the often raw and unlettered youth, a "graduated cadet" and "officer and gentleman." Academically, the cadet at West Point during the early period of the Military Academy's existence completed a course of studies almost as inflexible as the ratio studiorum of the Jesuits. In 1817, when Major Sylvanus Thayer assumed command of the Military Academy he

...organized the Academic Board and instituted the well-known honor system. He also enriched the academic fare. When he assumed office, instruction was given in mathematics, English, natural philosophy (the sciences), drawing and French. He added chemistry, general history, moral philosophy, law, geography and ethics. The emphasis remained upon military subjects, particularly military engineering... On the eve of the Civil War the West Point curriculum provided instruction in mathematics, the physical sciences, civil and military engineering, military tactics and gunnery, and in English composition, French, Spanish, rhetoric and ethics, constitutional, international, and military law, and history. Instruction in history, law and ethics was delegated to the Chaplain, "in addition to his other duties" (Ref 17, p 78).

In view of his primary mission, the soldier's education and training tended to be technical and professional. The operation of specific weapons and the tactical employment of men, weapons, and machines formed the basic elements of the education of a soldier. Generally, this was true of all armies throughout the civilized world. In the Napoleonic tradition, mathematics held sway as the most useful academic discipline for the training of the professional officer. In the United States, the Military Academy curriculum, from the very beginning in 1802, was centered around mathematical instruction. This heavy concentration upon mathematical science is well explained by history. Specifically

...The need to train artillerymen and engineers in mathematics was a premise of undergraduate

military education in the Napoleonic era. It was an important reason for the founding of West Point. Today, the Department of Mathematics at the Military Academy is the beneficiary of this great tradition. One cannot visit it without feeling that here is something more than an aggregate of teachers, pupils and textbooks; here is the citadel of an ancient faith. We also encountered a contention that mathematical and scientific studies are uniquely conducive to rigorous analytical thinking. (This argument is also used in defense of work in engineering.) Clarity of thought, ability to reason logically from given premises, and ability to order data systemically are much prized by professional officers. Many mathematicians and natural scientists at the academy are sincerely convinced that their subjects are especially likely to develop such capacities, or at least more likely to develop them than a study of Latin, lyrics, or law. (The course in logic includes the study of propaganda, fallacies, semantics, syllogistic reasoning, and scientific method. West Point includes some logic in its first year English course.) (Ref 17, p 215).

Social studies have not, in the past, formed important segments of the academic curriculum at West Point. Sufficient instruction in these areas was given to "round out" the cadets' education, but there was no great emphasis accorded them; their relevancy to the military profession had perforce to be shown.

That the military profession contained many facets which permitted of conversion to peaceful pursuits became evident after the establishment of the United States Military Academy. By virtue of its strict mathematical courses and field engineering classes, West Point was the first civil engineering school in the United States. Upon graduation, the ranking cadets of each class found themselves as Army officers in charge of such peaceful projects as bridge, road, railroad, and canal construction in the fledgling republic. This duty demonstrated that the professional officer could operate outside his military profession and still not lose his military character. The broadening cultural influence of this type duty upon the military professional must not be discounted (Ref 7).

That the West Point graduate was isolated may be noted from the following:

Traditionally, the military community has been more sharply segregated from civilian life in the United States than in the major nations of Western Europe. This social isolation has helped the military profession to maintain its distinctive

characteristics and values. The influence of aristocratic traditions was weak; the commercial and capitalist ethic which discounted the virtues of the professional soldier, was powerful. During much of its past history, the Army was located at remote frontier posts, fighting Indians. The minute size of the professional officer corps, as compared with the standing armies of Europe, helped to produce social isolation (Ref 13, pp 175-176).

From the very beginning of the United States Army, the primary object was to have it led by officers who were competent in their profession. The Military Academy, as the fountainhead of the military art in this country, established basic academic curricula for the training of cadets to be graduated and appointed as officers of the Army. From the point of view of national security, professional competence for the Army officer entailed complete proficiency in the techniques and tactics of his particular arm or service. The ultimate test was, of course, taken on the field of battle under enemy fire. The Army officer could convert his training in the delivery of violence to peaceful purposes. Essentially, this ability was a fringe benefit of his training in leadership and organization. The following comment upon the effect of the passage of time and the requirements of our society upon the West Point curriculum is significant of its continuing adjustment:

The latest revision of the West Point system of education and training is designed to provide a well-balanced curriculum giving proper emphasis to academic, tactical, physical, and moral training, with due regard for the balance between the humanistic-social and scientific - engineering academic fields. Its purpose is first to develop character in the tradition of West Point ideals of honor, integrity, duty, discipline, and leadership. It is also designed to give all graduates a basic education at the collegiate level under a program constantly adapted to the needs of the Army, and the necessary tactical and physical training required for competent military leadership (Ref 14, pp 88-89).

Since World War II, West Point and the other Service academies have been carefully studied and evaluated by civilian educators. The free movement of the academy graduate in the business world, or in the political arena, is a phenomenon of the post-war period. Hence, there has been greater interest in the educational foundation and cultural "finish" afforded by these world-reknowned institutions. While the official Boards of Visitors visit the academies and report their findings as to the adequacy and efficacy of curricula and other aspects, such as academic administration, social scientists have continued to study the academic educational system of West Point and other similar schools. A leading civilian sociologist in the study

of the military profession notes that

Despite contemporary trends in the curriculum, the academies, especially West Point and Annapolis, still emphasize an engineering content. As of 1958, one West Point academic administrator felt obliged to acknowledge in public print that the 425 hours devoted to mathematics were not essential for educational aims. The academies realize that even engineering has become too complicated for them to compete with specialized civilian institutes, so they make it possible for their graduates to go on to civilian schools for postgraduate study. The study of languages has increased, but with probably no more startling success than in civilian universities. Since the end of World War II, social science has found its way into the curriculum, mainly the form of military economics and the analysis of the current balance of power in international relations. Perhaps the most important development is the increase in the number of civilian instructors, and the increased opportunity for officers to study at civilian universities before becoming instructors at military academies (Ref 13. p 133).

Since the advent of the Cold War, the Military academy has sent forth her graduates to wage violent and nonviolent warfare. Basically trained to manage the operations and weapons of violent war, they have often found themselves involved in nonviolent or unconventional military activities. Academic courses in insurgency and revolution and guerrilla warfare are conducted at West Point. Cadets there are furnished comprehensive reading lists and bibliographies in these fields and are also exposed to outside, authoritative guest speakers on these subjects.

The addition of courses in group psychology and human relations in the West Point curriculum within the past ten years coupled with courses in political science has afforded the recent graduates a basis for performance of duty in civic actions, counterinsurgency situations. The broader professional term is "nation building." With civic action as the key to current "pacification" campaigns being mounted in Vietnam, there is a greater need for better understanding by the military of the critical and important Cold War counterinsurgency weapon. The political factors inherent in all insurgencies must be recognized and dealt with by professional Army officers in this age of protracted conflict.

In addition to the officer training program of the Military Academy, there are several other sources of officers for the United States Army. The primary nonmilitary academy source is found in the Reserve Officers Training Corps units scattered throughout the civilian universities over the country. These ROTC graduates enter the Army with a more liberal education, but often with a lessened degree of discipline, than that possessed by the West

Point graduate. With everything else equal, the four years of daily living under the strict discipline and honor code at the Military Academy contribute to a higher degree of personal discipline on the part of the West Point graduate.

Another source of Army officers is found in the type of educational institutions designated by the Department of The Army as "essentially military schools." These schools are usually of college or university level and operate Reserve Officers Training Corps but they differ from other ROTC schools. Essentially, this difference is noted in the fact that their ROTC cadets are in uniform and under military discipline at all times. This environment makes for a highly disciplined graduate who is usually more motivated toward a military career than is his contemporary who is the ROTC product of an essentially civilian institution. Individually, this graduate equates well with the Military Academy graduate. His education may be more liberal, or it may be more highly specialized since certain "essentially military schools" are technical institutions.

A third source of officers, especially during a national emergency, or in a Cold War or Vietnam-type action, is the Officer Candidate School (OCS). This school is operated for enlisted candidates by the various service schools of the arms and branches, under overall direction of the Department of the Army. The United States Continental Army Command has direct responsibility for the program. Historically, this system of officer training has descended from the Reserve Officers Training Camps of World War I, and the Officer Candidate Schools of World War II and the Korean War. Educationally, the requirements for OCS are cut off at high school graduate level. A certain score on the Army General Classification Test and motivation to be an officer are required. The physical requirements are high and emphasis is placed upon leadership skills, tactics, and techniques at the platoon commander level. Educationally, the OCS candidate may possess a college degree, but it is not usual. The average OCS graduate may not have the educational advantages of the West Point or ROTC graduate, but he possesses one distinct advantage--he has served in the ranks. As an officer, he will have a better understanding of the soldier's point of view.

The bulk of the young officers now entering the Army are from ROTC, or from Officer Candidate Schools. Approximately 3.5 percent of them are West Point graduates. This fact points up the necessity of filling in the gaps where the newly appointed officer may lack knowledge. Essentially, the institution to do this important task is the school of his arm or service at which he attends a basic course almost immediately after being commissioned. As the OCS candidate does not attend the basic course of his arm, because he has just completed a comparable course in weapons and small unit tactics, courses in "civic action" and "nation-building" activities are indicated as mandatory in the OCS curriculum. The ROTC graduate must also receive this essential instruction in the basic school of his arm or service which is his next period of professional education for his duties as an officer.

In mid-career, the Army officer, under his particular career pattern, continues his higher military education at the "college" level. These schools comprise the "graduate" training for the military professional. However, attendance is highly competitive from among the "superior" and "outstanding" officers of field grade. These institutions are "war colleges" at Army, Navy, or Air Force branch of service level. They teach tactics, strategy, logistics, command, national policy, and management to fit their graduates for positions of military command from battalion to division or higher level.

In his Professional Soldier, Janowitz has offered the following general comment, which is significant of the status of higher military education in the United States Army:

... Contemporary military education--from the academy to the war college--especially in the Army and the Air Force, seeks a sophisticated approach to the international political scene. The political aspects of the curriculum focus on a current-events analysis of diplomacy and international relations. -- None of the war college focuses on the management of political warfare -- that is, the practices involved in the coordination of military action with political persuasion.

The greater exposure of ground force officers to higher education, especially at the war college level, is but one of the many indices to the increased orientation of Army commanders to the political aspects of warfare, as compared to the two other services.

... An outstanding feature of the war college system is the increased use of civilian experts from universities and government agencies as instructors (Ref 13, pp 152-153).

The curriculum at the Military Academy has been modified progressively over the years following World War II. Prior to that conflict, a number of attempts were made by various individuals to modernize the West Point course of study. General Douglas MacArthur, as Superintendent after World War I, took steps to reduce the isolation of the cadet from the civilian community. The mental isolation of the cadet in the rock-bound academy was lessened by the addition of broad, cultural studies to the rigid scientific and engineering curriculum.

Traditionally, the military profession has been conservative with reference to change in its educational and training methods and tactics and techniques. There is logic in this conservatism and resistance to change in the techniques and weapons that worked well "in the last war." But wars today are never exactly like the last war. They are different; new and unusual tactics and techniques must be developed. Creativity, flexibility, and imagination are the qualities required in the military professional of today.

The Cold War has added a new dimension to the traditional military profession. This newest addition to the profession of arms is the use of nonviolent military activities as weapons to counterinsurgency. The military professional or amateur of today must understand the employment and management of these weapons. Conventional warfare is almost wholly inhibited by the threat of nuclear disaster. The present struggles between nations and ideologies usually involve insurgent strategy and tactics. For the present, guerrilla warfare has replaced conventional warfare as a vehicle for the waging of violence in the interests of a political cause or ideology, such as communism.

The modern professional must be able to operate in either the violent or nonviolent areas of military activity; officers and men must be versatile in their career patterns. To insure this ability, they must be educated or trained to understand the management of the nonviolent as well as the violent methods of waging warfare. The Military Academy and all other officer-producing programs are adjusting and changing their curricula to reflect this need for versatility. The careers of the officer and soldier must not be penalized because of his assignment to nonviolent military activities. In the past such an assignment traditionally meant professional "limbo" for the military professionals so assigned. Today, superior performance in both violent and nonviolent aspects of the military art must be expected and demanded of the military professional. Unless he is able to function in both, he is neither professional nor modern.

This professional career reorientation constitutes a challenge for those charged with the education of our military professionals or amateurs. It must be noted that in the Cold War, most active duty officers are not military careerists; however, these temporary officers must understand and perform in the same professional manner as the careerists. To give the permanent or temporary Army officer a base for professional versatility in the performance of his military duties, a start must be made in his early military education. Today, with violent and nonviolent warfare being waged concurrently, this means at the start of his basic education or training program. Usually, for the prospective long-term career officer this should be given at the Military Academy. For others who come into the military profession from other sources, this training should be provided in the Reserve Officers Training Corps units and in the Officer Candidate Schools.

Enlisted personnel must receive training or indoctrination comparable to that provided the officer-trainee. The noncommissioned officer, who is traditionally considered the "backbone" of the Army, must receive highly specialized technical training in order for him to perform his duties efficiently. But he needs more than technique! Individually, he must be motivated toward an understanding of how to operate in either the violent or nonviolent aspects of modern warfare. Noncommissioned Officer Academies, as provided by the several field armies, may provide the solution to the problem. At least, they should be made to bridge the gap between the formal academic education and training of the officer and the less formal academic education of the noncommissioned officer.

Over the years, in the United States Army, military educational curricula have undergone considerable change. Slowly, the social sciences have been integrated modestly into the courses of study at the Military Academy. These studies are expected to give the graduate an awareness of the cultural differences and political and human factors impinging upon the conduct of modern war. Similarly, in the ROTC and OCS programs, the curricula have been changed to reflect a modern approach to military operations in a Cold War, or counterinsurgency situation. However, much more remains to be done in the area of military educational reform.

In service schools and the war colleges, the curricula have been altered to include more emphasis upon cultural differences and international relations. At war college level, economic and political aspects of modern warfare are stressed. Warfare, in general, is considered in Clausewitzian style as "politics in another form." The military professional who graduates from a war college has been somewhat enlightened upon the various nuances of national policy. He must be more than a competent military leader, he must have the potential of commanding or serving at two or three ranks higher. The present curricula endeavor to give him the additional professional polish.

THE EARLY UNITED STATES ARMY ON THE AMERICAN FRONTIER

This study deals not with wars and campaigns, strategy and tactics, nor organizational and administrative techniques, but with the non-military services of the frontier soldiers. One might call them the incidental activities of the army in the West were it not that they represented conscious effort and often occupied the full attention of the soldiers. ... The long service of the peacetime army on the frontier was dull and monotonous, and in large part merely passive. But this is not to say that it was unimportant or insignificant. In the crucial period of "beginnings" the army's role cannot easily be overstated (Ref 18, pp ix-x).

After the American Revolution the miniscule Army of the new republic was faced with innumerable missions that were not within the scope of the conventional duties of the military professional. Among them were such activities as maintaining law and order, exploring, surveying, working on the national roads, moving Indian tribes, and even indulging in agriculture and medical pioneering. In the Army, officers and men of this period received little education and training, other than that required for them to perform properly their military duties. Hence, the nonmilitary activity which accrued was, in essence, a by-product of the necessity for survival of the soldier in the wilderness or on the frontier at its edge.

The Lewis and Clark Expedition of 1804-1806 was one of the most significant of the nonmilitary activities undertaken by personnel of the early United States Army. Essentially, the expedition was organized for the purpose of exploring a vast, uncharted wilderness: the mountains and plains area acquired through purchase from the French Emperor, Napoleon the First. But the mission of Captain Meriwether Lewis, commander of the group, was more than exploration. In addition to observing and taking samples of the flora and fauna of the regions traversed, the native Indians were to be contacted and, when feasible, met with in council and informed verbally of the authority of the United States over them and the area. As little was known about the Indians who were indigenous to the areas to be explored, the expedition had to be constantly on the alert for attacks, and so was composed of well-armed soldiers and officers, with a few guides and interpreters. In effect, the expedition was prepared to fight, or to hold formal councils of friendship, as required. In order to establish some form of amicable relationship with the Indians, the then President of the United States, Thomas Jefferson, authorized Captain Lewis to present "peace" medals and parchment commissions to the chiefs of the various tribes encountered upon the journey (Ref 19).

Fort Atkinson, which was the most Western post of the United States at this time, was established and garrisoned by the Sixth United States Infantry Regiment and elements of the First Rifle Regiment and some attached artillery units. Brevet Brigadier General Henry Atkinson and Brevet Brigadier General Henry Leavenworth are both prominently identified with this early post. General Atkinson, who had a Kentucky plantation background, was years ahead of his time in requiring his troops to grow vegetables to prevent scurvy, the scourge of many frontier posts.

When the forts were built, the soldiers turned from lumbering to farming, and the sawmills were transformed into flour mills, for it was required of the garrisons that they raise their own vegetables. At Fort Atkinson, where special efforts were made to promote cultivation of the soil because of its remoteness from the settlements, farming operations were begun in the spring of 1820, and October 28 Atkinson reported that more than 10,000 bushels of corn, 4,000 bushels of potatoes, 4,000 to 5,000 bushels of turnips and 250 tons of hay were to be harvested. Whenever a fort was established on the western frontier, the surrounding prairie was made to yield provisions for its garrison, and this practice continued. Here was an object lesson for the immigrants from the forested regions of the East who considered the prairies sterile because they grew no trees. To grind the wheat that was raised, mills were built at Fort Atkinson and Fort Snelling. That at the latter place was located at the Falls of St. Anthony, and it was the first mill in a region which was later to be noted for its extensive flour milling industry (Ref 21, pp 175-176) (See Fig 2).

From Fort Atkinson, the troops built roads to Chariton, Missouri, the nearest post office. Much travel was done on the river in company-size keel boats, between the Council Bluff and St. Louis. In 1820, Captain Stephen Watts Kearny led an expedition across country to the Falls of St. Anthony near Fort Snelling, Minnesota. General Atkinson and his troops introduced the primitive steamboats to the area and the creative military leader invented a hand-propelled paddle wheel for the keel boats which hauled troops and impedimenta (Ref 22, p 98).

Relations with the local Indian tribes near the Council Bluff were excellent. In its brief history (1819-1827) as the westernmost post of the United States Army, Fort Atkinson never fired a shot in anger. One expedition was mounted in 1823 against the Mandan Indian villages to the north in punishment or retaliation for an Indian attack upon a party of fur traders of the American Fur Company headed by militia General Ashley of Missouri. Colonel Henry Leavenworth, the post and regimental commander, moved his troops northward up the Missouri in keelboats and attacked and burned




Figure 2. Fort Atkinson - Site of Early Western Agricultural Development

the offending villages. There was no further action on the part of the United States government in connection with this early punitive expedition against the Plains Indian. Colonel Leavenworth's decisive action was approved by the civil authorities (Ref 23).

With no formal military or academic education and training for understanding the Indian, the average Army officer of the times was almost totally dependent for Indian lore upon the civilian trappers, hunters, and scouts who had lived on the plains. Many of the traders married into the Indian tribes in order to facilitate their trading with the Indians. The classic example of this traditional situation was that of Pierre Charbonneau, a trapper, who with his Indian wife, Sacawajea, accompanied the Lewis and Clark Expedition of 1804-1806. The record of the Expedition shows clearly that much of the success of the mission may be ascribed to the faithful interpreting and skillful guiding of Charbonneau's Indian wife (Ref 24, pp 281-282).

In 1831 the Commanding General at the headquarters of the Army in Washington, Major General Alexander Macomb authorized a most unusual reconnaissance of the Indian country, to be made by Captain Benjamin L. E. Bonneville of the 7th Infantry Regiment, Class of 1815, West Point. Captain Bonneville was given an indefinite leave to engage, ostensibly as a private citizen, in the fur trade in the Rocky Mountains and beyond in the Far West. Colonel Fairfax Downey, a distinguished contemporary military historian of the American military scene, describes Captain Bonneville's mission as follows:

One of the most remarkable reconnaissances since Lewis and Clark was made as a private though semiofficial venture by Captain Benjamin L. E. Bonneville, Class of 1815 West Point, with 107 volunteers from the 7th Infantry. The letter in which Major General Alexander Macomb granted him permission and leave of absence is well worth quotation as illustrating the Army's thorough method of accumulating information of military and other value. Bonneville was directed to explore the country to the Rocky Mountains and beyond "with a view to ascertaining the nature and character of the soil, the productions, the minerals, the natural history, the climate, the geography and topography..." (Ref 25, pp 152-153).

The Commanding General of the Army knew precisely what he wanted Captain Bonneville to determine. His directive of 1831 compares favorably with a modern twentieth century intelligence estimate. The essential elements of information, required by the general and returned by the captain, proved of inestimable value, especially contacts of the United States Army with the Indian tribes visited by the "fur traders." While the bulk of the Bonneville mission evolved around military requirements, there were other portions which covered the cultural and sociological differences of the Indians as compared to contemporary white man's cultural mores. This expedition, unlike the Lewis and Clark journey of a quarter of

a century before, appeared to be a first serious attempt at understanding the Indian and his culture. The instructions to Captain Bonneville were explicit:

It is desirable, the general continued, that you note particularly the number of warriors that may be in each tribe or nation that you meet with; their alliances with other tribes and their relative position as to a state of peace or war...their mode of subsisting themselves during a state of war, and a state of peace; their arms, and the effect of them; whether they act on foot or horseback; detailing the discipline and maneuvers of the war parties; the power of their horses, size and general description; in short, every information which you may conceive would be useful to the government (Ref 25, pp 152-153).

As the frontier advanced westward, US Army forts and posts were established and maintained. Their primary function was to protect settlers from Indian attacks and to guard the trails which led to the West. Often they were engaged in protecting the interests of the Indian in his inevitable contacts with the frontiersman and fur trader. Thus, the log, stone, or adobe forts became centers of civilization. The officers and men were skilled in the arts of the soldier but they could function as well in such nonviolent areas of activity as agriculture, medicine, road building, lumbering, and milling. Obviously, most of these activities were necessary for the maintenance of the post and the individual soldier's health. However, successful farming activities demonstrated that the land was fertile and highly productive. The Army surgeon was often the only doctor within hundreds of miles and early settlers depended upon him for medical care. The work of Captain William Beaumont in medical research in the field of human digestive processes was a distinct advance in medical science. His subject was a half-breed Indian civilian who was brought to the Army surgeon for treatment of an accidental gunshot wound. Later, Walter Reed, as Post Surgeon at Fort Robinson, Nebraska after the Civil War, was to earn for his ministrations the gratitude of the settlers and friendly Indians in the sandhills of Western Nebraska and on the plains of Arizona long before he became famous for his discoveries of the basic causes of malaria and yellow fever.

It wasn't long before the settlers for miles around found out: you could always call on the post doctor: he never failed the sick or distressed. He had been known to come out on a pressing call -- these lonely people rarely sent for the doctor until it was an emergency -- when he was so ill himself that he had to lie down on arriving and rest before seeing the patient. He made a sick person feel better the moment he came in the room. He joked and played with the children. The women, drab and stringy from overwork were touched as much by the hint of chivalry in his manner toward them as by his painstaking care. A man might, at first sight,

underestimate him for his thin mustache, his quick, slender figure and his quiet manner, but only at first glance. There was an endurance and courage in the Army doctor of which the toughest settler might have been proud (Ref 26, pp 132-133).

The frontier Army post served another purpose -- it was a cultural island in the vast sea of plains or mountains. Books and newspapers were brought into these areas by the Army; the first schools were those within the stockaded walls of a lonely prairie fort. The officers, educated either at West Point or in civilian institutions, were men of high learning in a time when average men did not know how to write or read. Travellers in the early days on the plains often expressed amazement at the levels of culture and hospitality encountered at certain Army posts in the West. Although the commanding officers were required by their isolated circumstances to impose a strict discipline, it was also incumbent upon them to maintain a degree of "civilization" in the midst of the uncouth wilderness. The presence of wives and children gave the pioneer military community a modicum of gentility not often met on the frontier.

In an area noted for its lawlessness, the Army uniform stood for law and order for decades before laws were on the statute books. The soldier and the flag were symbols of legal authority which derived their strength from a national source--the Constitution of the United States. As an agent of the President, the soldier carried the authority and prestige of that high office into the far-away and desolate areas of our newly developed nation.

The missions of the United States Army on the frontier before the Civil War were numerous and varied. While they were, of necessity, connected with the art of war, often they were not so identifiable. With its organization, leadership, and discipline, the Army could perform many functions which ultimately led to what today would be termed "nation building." The control of the incipient insurgency of the Indian and the blazing of trails and roads to the West were but a few of the nonmilitary projects accomplished by soldiers in uniform. Today, there is hardly a western state whose beginning and continuation did not, at some time, depend upon the presence of an Army post.

Like the Roman legion of old, the small units of the Army brought a civilizing force into the wilderness. Law and order, education, agriculture, and communication were but a few of the aspects of orderly group and community living brought forth and sustained by the "civilizing" effect of the Army on the frontier. This activity was performed not with the musket, or rifle, but with the broadax, plow, and shovel. The military profession on the frontier demonstrated that it possessed the capability of functioning in a nonviolent as well as a violent role. Traditional military education did not provide specific training for such nonmilitary activities. In essence, these nonviolent actions were initiated and continued as direct means of survival of the military unit and the members thereof. Food, clothing, shelter, and medical care were ancillary conditions reinforcing the soldier's ability to carry out his primary mission: combat. But when

they were not required for the basic function of combat, soldiers could function as builders, surveyors, physicians, farmers, and teachers. With fighting reduced to the minimum, or completely eliminated, the soldier's skills were turned to construction rather than destruction. Thus, the early United States Army followed in the traditional Roman legion pattern as a nation-building force.

WAR WITH MEXICO

A soldier who loved peace instead of war, a general who valued the lives of his troops more than glory, a conquerer who became in the hour of triumph a friend, and a citizen who placed his country above self-interest, he (Winfield Scott) was the ideal commander of a Republican army (Ref 31).

An episode of the early phase of the Mexican War which established certain principles of military government in the United States was the experience of Brigadier Stephen Watts Kearny, United States Army, at Santa Fe, New Mexico and later, as the conquerer of California. This most distinguished frontier officer was the same Captain Kearny who, twenty-six years earlier, had been at old Fort Atkinson on the Council Bluff in 1820. Striking out with the "Army of The West," Kearny cut away from his base and marched his troops, both mounted and dismounted, over 800 miles into Mexican territory. On 31 July 1846 General Kearny was at Bent's Fort assembling his command, which was an odd mixture of Regulars, Missouri militia, and a specially organized volunteer infantry battalion composed of members of the Church of the Latter Day Saints, or Mormons. The organization of this unit was, in effect, civic action of a kind, for the Mormons were enlisted expressly in order for them to march to California. Here was an example of migration by military means, under the sponsorship of the United States government (Ref 27, p 113).

General Kearny was a graduate not of the Military Academy but of Columbia College who had served in the War of 1812 and continued in the Regular service. While essentially a military intellectual of his day, Kearny was also a stern, devoted, professional soldier. A strict disciplinarian, he brooked no interference with his exercise of command as witnessed in his court-martial of Lieutenant Colonel John C. Fremont, following the conquest and occupation of Spanish-Mexican California (Ref 27, pp 8-9 and 347-373; Ref 28).

Kearny, as the senior commander of United States troops about to enter foreign territory for purpose of conquest, issued a proclamation which stated that the mission of his "large military force" (about 1700 officers and men) was "to seek union with and ameliorate the condition of" the inhabitants. The employment of the word "ameliorate" by the commanding general in his proclamation is highly significant of an early approach to "civic action." This was also excellent propaganda! The following comment by the distinguished military historian, Colonel Oliver L. Spaulding is of interest.

On August 22, 1846, at Santa Fe, he issued a much longer one, formally announcing annexation of New Mexico to the United States. Having assumed full responsibility for the civil government of the territory, he proceeded, during the next month, to issue a series of orders regulating that government -- beginning with a

bulletin providing a revenue by establishing license fees for all sorts of things, from trader's caravans at \$4.00 per wagon to monte tables at \$1.50 per night, and culminating in an organic law and civil and criminal codes. The organic law was based upon that of Missouri Territory; codes upon those of Mexico, Texas, Missouri. They were drafted by Colonel Doniphan, a leading lawyer in his home state, with the assistance of some of the men of his regiment -- notably Private Willard P. Hall, who was elected, in his absence, as a member of Congress from Missouri, and received the news at Santa Fe. The government thus set up operated smoothly during the military occupation, and formed the basis of the permanent government after the war (Ref 15, pp 192-193).

The Mexican War (1846-1848) and its marches, campaigns, and battles became proving grounds for the graduates of the United States Military Academy. In the field the professionally educated and trained Army officer shone forth brilliantly. The commanding general in the siege and occupation of Mexico City, General Winfield Scott, pronounced his immortal and unqualified statement of approval of the education and training of the graduated cadets as follows:

I give it as my fixed opinion, that but for our graduated cadets, the war between the United States and Mexico might, and probably would, have lasted some four or five years, with, in its first half, more defeats than victories falling to our share; whereas, in less than two campaigns we conquered a great country and a peace, without the loss of a single battle or skirmish (Ref 14, p 120).

General Scott, from the point of view of the Army commander, was speaking in terms of planning, combat leadership, discipline, command, and control. However, his reference to conquering a peace could mean but one thing, the successful occupation of Mexico City and the country by the American forces. For the first time in our military experience, the United States Army was placed in the position of having to re-establish civil government and law and order in a conquered nation. With few civilians, other than lawyers among the volunteers accompanying the army, the professional officers were forced to act ex officio as civil administrators and governors. The following extract is significant of the Army's participation in civil affairs:

For two months the only responsible government in Mexico was the American military government under Scott. The collection of the revenues, the suppression of disorder, the administration of justice, all the details of governing the country were in the hands of the Army (Ref 29, pp 176-177).

The occupation of Mexico by the United States Army (a map of US Army-occupied Mexico is shown in Fig. 3) under General Winfield Scott was so successful that it became a model for future United States Army occupations. His foresight in issuing a proclamation when he first entered Mexico in the form of General Orders No. 20, 19 February 1847, which covered the principles of government of occupied territories enabled the victorious commander to begin to operate civil affairs immediately upon the end of active fighting. General Orders No. 287, dated 17 September 1847 amplified the original General Orders No. 20 and implemented the occupation. Scott's plan, as cited in the General Orders, provided certain basic principles, such as leaving as much of the conduct of local affairs as possible in the hands of the established officials. These officials were to be supervised in the conduct of their duties by the assigned United States Army personnel.

General Orders No. 287 provided among other items that:

For the ease and safety of both parties in all cities and towns occupied by the American Army, a Mexican police force shall be established and duly harmonized with the military police of said forces (Ref 31, p 111).

This principle has proved valid and workable after the lapse of over one hundred years and several wars and military occupations by the United States Army.

Of special significance to the overall success of the military government exercised by the United States Army in Mexico, was the fact that the commanding general and military governor, Winfield Scott was a lawyer prior to his entrance into the service in 1808 as a captain of light artillery. Scott left William and Mary College in Williamsburg, Virginia, after one year as a student and studied law in the office of an attorney in Petersburg, Virginia. He was admitted to practice in Virginia in 1806 (Ref 30, pp 8-9).

The occupation of Mexico by the United States Army under the command of General Winfield Scott exemplifies the "enlightened approach" to military government of a conquered people. Scott, as a trained lawyer, as well as a professional soldier, understood the mission and purpose of military government. In accord with the custom of the times (and this custom obtains today) the general required that the Mexicans, as a defeated people, pay an indemnity to cover the cost of maintaining the United States troops in the occupation. However, his judicious administration conducted the occupation in such an economical manner that a large surplus of funds accrued. With this sum, which amounted to over one hundred thousand dollars, Winfield Scott founded the US Soldiers' Asylum, now known as the US Soldiers' Home, in Washington, D. C. Law and order and functioning local government were the chief concern of the American military government in Mexico. The Mexican countryside was sanctuary for renegades and bandits and the United States Army assisted the Mexican authorities in controlling and eliminating these outlaws.

Inasmuch as the head of the former Mexican government was a fugitive, the United States Army, through its military government and other personnel,




Figure 3. Mexico - Where Military Government Patterns Were Established by the United States Army

was the de facto government until the peace treaty was signed. In this area, General Scott, the military governor, was a leading spirit and it was due largely to his diplomatic abilities that the peace treaty was secured quickly and promptly, in spite of lack of guidance from Washington. On the local level, Army officers acted as mayors and judges when required. However, the basic principle that the local officials be continued in office whenever feasible was adhered to, at the insistence of the military governor. This principle has survived as a tenet of US military government policy to the present time.

Little evidence is found with reference to civic action in Mexico. Roads and streets were repaired and cleaned and some degree of sanitation was established by the occupying troops.

THE CIVIL WAR AND THE POST-CIVIL WAR RECONSTRUCTION

One of the almost insurmountable social problems created by the Civil War was an offspring of the Emancipation Proclamation which freed all negro slaves in the United States and Confederate States territories. Before the Proclamation and during the war, hundreds of thousands of "Freedmen," men, women, and children, followed in the wake of the Union armies in the field. Termed "contraband of war" by Major General Benjamin Butler, the ex-slaves constituted a labor force of inestimable value to the Union Army. But there were those for whom work could not be found; those who were too old or too young to be of service to the war effort. However, as the "children of Uncle Sam" they were fed and clothed with spare Army clothing and many of them worked around the camps as servants, cooks, or cooks' helpers.

Nearly 200,000 negro men were enlisted in the United States Army between 1862 and 1865.

The efforts of the colored troops were supplemented by those of Negro military laborers, un-uniformed but important, too, in the winning of the war. So many uses had been found for them, as teamsters, hostlers, laborers on fortifications, railroad builders, cargo handlers, personal servants to officers, hospital attendants, pickers of abandoned sixty-cent cotton, woodchoppers for steamboats on the rivers, that by the time of their emancipation the military demand for their labor often exceeded the supply. But neither the employment of Negroes by the military nor their enlistment in the Colored Troops offered more than a temporary solution for the problem of what to do with, or for, or to, the newly freed Negro (Ref 32, pp 19-20).

Except for the Army-operated negro refugee programs, there was almost complete lack of civic action during the Civil War. The nature of that struggle somewhat precluded the extending of a helping hand to those "erring sisters" who had strayed from the Union. The invasion of the South by the Union forces was done to break the backbone of the Confederacy by driving the Confederates back and depriving them of a source of supply. This was, in essence, a "scorched earth" policy as exemplified by General William T. Sherman's march from Atlanta to the sea. This was total warfare with destruction of roads, telegraph lines, and railroads, and the seizure of food stores and cattle depriving the agricultural South of the means of sustaining the war effort against the industrial North.

... (General William T.) Sherman held a personal conference with Secretary (of War) Stanton and some twenty leaders of the Negroes, and as a result of this meeting issued Special Field Orders number 15. By these orders he reserved for Negro settlement the coastal islands from Charleston south, the abandoned rice fields on the river banks for thirty miles from the coast, and the country bordering the St. Johns River. In these areas freedmen were to be given "possessory titles" to farms

of not over forty acres of tillable land per family. The military would protect them in their tenure of these farms until they could protect themselves "or until Congress shall regulate their title." They were to be free to manage their own affairs, subject only to the rules of the United States military forces and to Congress, and General (Rufus) Saxton was to be the Inspector of Settlements and Plantations. Thus, a general, with the aid and advice of the Secretary of War, disposed of enormous stretches of the abandoned lands of the South and provided for the settlement and government of the Negroes thereon under military supervision (Ref 32, p 45).

General Ulysses S. Grant was one of the first Union commanders to recognize at an early date the problem of the freedmen in the backwash of the war. Fully occupied with the fighting of his army, Grant had, at first, treated the freed negroes as vagrants and ordered them out of and away from his camps. The Preliminary Emancipation Act shed another light upon the refugee negro problem and General Grant, as the senior Federal military commander assumed responsibility for those in the area of his operations, but

...when Negroes flocked into his lines in vast numbers immediately after he occupied Grand Junction, Tennessee, in November 1862, he felt that he must provide for them. Not wanting idlers in his camps, and lacking either authority or desire to simply dole out food, he determined that Negroes unable to do military work must be set back at their familiar labor, saving the crops of cotton and corn now standing ripe in the fields. To organize them for this work Grant sent for Chaplain (John) Eaton, and together they began one of the largest-scale military establishments for helping the freedmen (Ref 32, p 21).

Major General Benjamin Butler was a former politician and lawyer turned wartime soldier (see Fig 4). His military skill was vocal rather than tactical. He was a past master at issuing proclamations, and his military government rule at New Orleans was marked by vicious public relations with the civil population of that occupied city. But in spite of his bombastic approach to military command and military government, General Butler did possess considerable administrative and organizing ability. He was one of the first of the Union commanders to recognize the responsibility of the United States with respect to the growing mobs of refugee negro freedmen following in the wake of the Federal armies. His designation of the freed negro as "contraband" of war was to add to his fame as a turner of phrases. But as Commanding General of the Department of Virginia, he attacked the problem with vigor and in the east

...the best organized system for helping the freedmen was the one ordered into effect by (General Benjamin) Butler on December 5, 1863. Butler's predecessors in




Figure 4. Two United States Army Leaders Who Recognized the Problem of the "Freedman"

command of the Department of Virginia and North Carolina, Generals (John E.) Wool and John G. Foster, had dealt with their Negro problem rather ineffectively. To improve upon their efforts, Butler appointed a "general superintendent of Negro affairs" for the department. Under this officer, Lieutenant Colonel J. Burnham Kinsman, were Captain Charles B. Wilder, superintendent in Virginia North of the James River, Captain Orlando Brown, in charge of Virginia South of that stream, and Chaplain Horace James, who was to be responsible for Negro welfare in North Carolina. These officers were required to take censuses of the Negroes in their districts, to help their charges find employment and see that they continued at work, to protect them from fraud or chicanery in their labor contracts, to supervise crop-divisions between employers and workers, and to help the Negroes market their shares of the crop. They were also to make certain that laborers received food, shelter, clothing, and medicine and to guide and assist charities helping the Negroes (Ref 32, p 25).

Actually, before the establishment of the Freedmen's Bureau, the United States Army had been operating a "civic action" program for a minority group within the country. As a wartime measure and before the advent of the Bureau, the Army professional demonstrated that he possessed the motivation and skill to cope with a social, rather than a military, problem. Within the rank and file of the Army were individuals who could function successfully in a nonviolent organizational or management activity. The Army, sometimes assisted by the Treasury Department, compiled an impressive list of accomplishments in the relief of the negro refugees. For example:

The United States had fed at least 75,000 of them from January 1, 1863, to January 1, 1865, and had spent some \$700,000 on food and supplies for them. It still maintained "contraband" camps and "corrals" almost every place where the Union armies had spent much time -- at Arlington and Alexandria, near Cairo and Memphis and Nashville, on Craney Island, near Fortress Monroe, and on Roanoke Island. Saxton had filled "every cabin and house" on the Sea Islands with freed people. Eaton had his "Negro Paradise" at Davis Bend, Mississippi, Conway his Bureau of Free Labor in Louisiana, and across the river from New Bern, North Carolina. Chaplain Horace James was managing the "Trent River Camp." The latter establishment was described in the National Freedman for April 1865 as a "model for imitation." It had more than 800 homes, which sheltered 2,798 freedmen, regularly laid-out streets, and numerous

vegetable gardens. James, like Eaton, had tried to give the Negroes in his colony a measure of self-government, but this had not worked out very well. A council of fifteen leading freedmen had been appointed to act as a medium for enforcing James' rules. They had proved to be too ignorant, however, to keep records, too jealous to work well together, and "too little raised in culture" above the common people to command their respect (Ref 32, p 63).

By virtue of this close association with the freed negro, the United States Army was deemed by the government to be the best-qualified and -equipped agency to organize and direct the Freedmen's Bureau. A first-rate military professional, General Oliver Otis Howard, West Point, Class of 1854, Medal of Honor winner, a distinguished field commander, who lost an arm in combat was nominated to head

...the Freedmen's Bureau created by Congress on 3 March 1865. Later granted very wide powers, the Bureau was originally designed to help former slaves adjust to a life of freedom. It furnished food and clothing to needy Negroes and helped them find employment. It secured homesteads for the Negroes on Public lands, protected their rights on labor contracts, established schools and hospitals for them, and protected their civil rights in unfriendly Southern communities. The Commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau was Major General Oliver O. Howard, who divided the South into ten districts each with an assistant commissioner in charge. A considerable number of Army officers were employed by the Bureau to carry out its assigned tasks (Ref 29, pp 277-278).

In a very real sense, General Howard's activity with the Freedmen's Bureau was the Army's first involvement in a "civic action" program that can compare with those operated under its aegis today. The Districts in the field under the Freedmen's Bureau operated by Army officers as Assistant Commissioners demonstrated, at this early date, that the United States Army had both the capacity and the personnel for such a program. The operation of the Freedmen's Bureau was a novel departure for the Army. This activity was indeed "civic action" of a very primitive type. The task of bringing order out of chaos in a society bereft of its slave labor, which now roamed the countryside and towns without homes, food, or employment, was a challenge to the leadership, organization, compassion, and humanity of the military personnel assigned to this unusual duty. The third Freedmen's Bureau bill was enacted July 16, 1865. This legislation empowered General Howard to appoint Army officers as clerks and as assistant commissioners. These individuals were not civilians but were military personnel detailed by War Department order from the active Army. The new law

...stipulated that the Commissioner and the Bureau officers should "extend military protection and have military jurisdiction over all cases and questions concerning the free enjoyment of...rights and immunities." This authority however, was to be exercised only in the districts where the judicial processes of civil law had been interrupted either as the result of the war or as the result of "unreconstructed" interpretations of prevailing laws (Ref 34, p xv).

But as Major De Forest, the author of A Union Officer in the Reconstruction soon discovered, his duties were perhaps the most unusual that a United States Army officer had ever been ordered to perform. The duties of the Assistant Commissioner of the Freedmen's Bureau at Greenville, South Carolina in October 1866 were described in the Introduction to Major De Forest's book as follows:

...Such men as these bore varied responsibilities that would have taxed the combined capacities of a social service worker, an administrative official, a labor conciliator, and a judge. They were required to supervise labor contracts between employers and freedmen, to administer rations and clothing to destitute freedmen, to promote and supervise schools for the Negroes, to provide transportation where it would serve a beneficial purpose, to investigate complaints and disputes between Negroes themselves or between Negroes and whites, to forestall any acts of violence against the Negroes, or any unfairness to them in the courts, to report such cases as could not be forestalled, and to maintain industry and good conduct among the Negroes themselves. These duties they must perform within the inflexible routine of the Army, with its elaborate system of reports and its rigid requirements of accountability for equipment and supplies. These objectives they must achieve through their own jurisdiction, without transgressing upon the ill-defined authority of civil officials or military government, for their administration was quite separate from that of the military governor of the district (Ref 34, pp xvi-xvii).

On the highest levels of military government, the five major generals who were assigned as military governors of the reconstructing states were faced with political problems strange to the military professional. These temporary "governors" were possessed of great power as they were in direct control of the provisional state governments. Since at first

...no elections were permitted, all appointments and removals were made from military headquarters, which soon became political beehives, centers of wire-pulling and agencies for the distribution of spoils. At the outset civil officers were ordered to retain their offices during good behavior, subject to military control. But no local official was permitted to use his influence ever so slightly against reconstruction. ...The generals complained that there were not enough competent native "loyalists" to fill the offices, and frequently an army officer was installed as governor, treasurer, secretary of state, auditor or mayor. In nearly all towns the police force was reorganized and former Federal soldiers were added to the force, while the regular troops were used for general police purposes and for rural constabulary...

The military administration was thorough, and as a whole honest and efficient. With fewer than ten thousand soldiers the generals maintained order and carried on the reconstruction of the South (Ref 35, pp 144-146).

One of the first problems facing the South at the end of the war was the return home of demobilized Confederate soldiers. In most instances, these individuals were returning to destroyed, disorganized, or impoverished homes and communities. The economy and labor system of the Southern states as they had known it was almost completely disintegrated by four years of bitter fighting and the ultimate invasion. The first practical and effective civic action of the post-Civil War period was performed by General Grant, when at Appomattox he ordered the issue of thousands of rations to the starving soldiers of General Lee. Further, he suggested that the ex-troops retain their horses for "the Spring plowing." With that good beginning, the dismissed soldiers were forgotten! The Freedmen's Bureau was in no sense an agency to care for the destitute whites, either civilian or ex-soldier, who could not find employment and personal security in their former states and counties, but the Bureau found itself serving both blacks and whites in the interests of humanity. The nature of this service which was rendered to both races is described below.

The relief work which was carried on for more than four years consisted in caring for sick Negroes who were within reach of the hospitals, furnishing food and sometimes clothing and shelter to destitute blacks and whites, and transporting refugees of both races back to their homes. Nearly a hundred hospitals and clinics were established, and half a million patients treated. ...The Bureau claimed little credit, and is usually given none, for keeping alive during the fall and winter of 1865-1866 thousands of destitute whites. Yet more than a third of the food was issued to whites, and without it many would have starved. Numerous Confederate Soldiers on their

way home after the surrender were fed by the Bureau, and in the destitute white districts a great deal of suffering was relieved and prevented by its operations (Ref 35, pp 107-108).

The educational work of the Freedmen's Bureau was centered primarily on the elementary school level. This approach was in the reading and writing skills since few negroes had been taught to write. In some areas of the South prior to the Civil War, it was against the law, or custom, to teach a negro to read and write. General Howard's military career had been marked not only by distinguished service in the field, but also by Christian piety. His interest in religious matters naturally came to the surface in his Freedmen's Bureau activities. His plan to train the negro in the religious calling came to the fore in a proposed "Howard Theological Seminary" for negro clergy. The funds for the project were to come from the Freedmen's Bureau, if land could be furnished from private sources. The following extract is of interest:

Howard University had had its inception on November 20, 1866, when a group of influential Congregationalists in Washington, D. C., had met to discuss the founding of a theological school for Negroes. The Reverend F. B. Morris had called the meeting, and among those he had invited to be present were Senator Henry Wilson; Senator Samuel C. Pomeroy, a Kansas Radical; Representative Burton C. Cook, an Illinois lawyer who later helped impeach the President; and Oliver O. Howard. Howard had offered to use Freedmen's Bureau funds to provide a building for the proposed "Howard Theological Seminary," if the other men would furnish the necessary land. At a later meeting the group of founders had decided to include teachers' and lawyers' colleges in their institution, and accordingly had changed its name to "Howard University." General Howard had modestly protested against this use of his name, but the name had been retained, and on March 2, 1867, Congress had chartered the new school for Negroes (Ref 32, p 203).

The latter sentences of the above-quoted extract are noted with reference to the General's fear that he would be thought raising a monument to himself if Howard University was named in his honor. Rather, it would seem that two institutions in the Washington area, the Freedmen's Hospital and Howard University are monuments, not to General Howard but to the primitive and early civic action done by the United States Army during and after the Civil War.

The recognition by the Army of the problem of the negro refugees during and after the Civil War demonstrated that the professional and the wartime officer and soldier possessed the capability of operating on a nonmilitary mission. Generals Grant, Sherman, and Howard were West Point graduates

and were ex officio leaders in the movement to aid the negro. General Benjamin Butler, a military amateur, brought the problem into sharp focus and offered workable solutions in the refugee camps established in his command area. The subordinate positions in the Freedmen' s Bureau were held usually by wartime volunteer officers who were held in the service for duty with the Bureau. These individuals were not, in the main, professional soldiers, but they had learned military organization and administration in the field during the war. Their skills at command and the mass handling of people were to stand them in good stead in their Districts in the South.

While it is true that General Howard set the tone and policy for the Freedmen' s Bureau, the assistant commissioners and minor administrative officers carried the real burden of the success or failure of the Bureau. Any degree of success it achieved may be ascribed to their devotion to the task and response to the inspired leadership of General Howard. Thus, they were enabled to convert the skills of war to nonmilitary usage to achieve a humanitarian goal.

THE INDIAN WARS

In modern terms, the Indian Wars of the United States may be considered insurgencies mounted by a minority group against the government. Also, they included racial overtones and conflict waged by "civilized" men against "savage" men. There were no rules of war, no quarter asked or given. As the frontier pushed westward, the Indian was dispossessed of his lands, hunting grounds, and sources of game. Often, he was subjected to the tactics of dishonest white men who cheated him for his furs. The Indians' reputation for brutality and cruelty was matched by the activities of some whites who followed the philosophy that "the only good Indian is a dead one."

From the earliest colonial days, there were geographical areas where the relations between the white and red man were good. But the desire of the expanding population for more land and the commercial need for furs demanded that the Indian be moved forcibly to new localities. The red men were required to give over their former lands to the white men for settlement, fur trapping, and game hunting. This enforced movement of Indian tribes to new territories was a most difficult task. The one agency of the Federal government with qualifications for such an undertaking was the United States Army. Skilled in the mass handling of humanity, either in camp or in the field, the Army officer was a natural selection for this difficult task. The movement of the Cherokees exemplifies this important point:

...The Cherokees, a civilized tribe of Indians, had occupied lands in North Carolina, Tennessee, Georgia, and Alabama, having a fully organized government with written constitution. White settlers were continually intruding upon their territory. In 1833, these intrusions had been serious enough to call for military action, and regular troops were ordered into the field to protect the Indians. Everything was quiet as long as the troops remained, but whenever they were removed the troubles began again. In 1835 a treaty had been made, by which the Cherokees were to be removed west of the Mississippi, but only a part of them actually went.

...In the spring of 1838 a definite effort was made to remove them. Colonel William Lindsay, 2d Artillery, was placed in charge of preparations. Few regular troops were available, for most of them were...in more active Indian operations...above...4,000 militiamen were called out from the States concerned. A camp-site was prepared, 12 miles by 4, in southeastern Tennessee. General Scott arrived early in May, and began concentration of the tribe there.

It was a most delicate task; first, the Indians had to be persuaded to come; then they had to be protected against the thieves and gamblers who promptly assembled to collect a share of the Government allowances paid them for indemnity

and damages. The concentration completed, the volunteer troops were gradually discharged, leaving only the regulars ... General Scott accompanied the tribe on part of the route (Ref 15, pp 159-160).

Indeed, here may be found one of the earliest examples of the United States Army operating in the field of what is now termed "civic action." Without the careful supervision by the military over the movement there can be no doubt but that it would have become a prime cause of insurgency on the part of the tribe. The leadership exerted by Colonel William Lindsay and later, General Winfield Scott, carried with it the authority of the government and engendered the respect of the Indian. Essentially an exercise in logistics, the human relations involved in the movement of the Cherokees proved that the military professional could operate successfully in areas other than tactical. It is of special interest to note that the art of "gentle persuasion" was employed by the soldier to convince the Indian to move.

The Army's attitude toward the Indian has been discussed and commented upon by historians of the Indian War periods. The regular soldier was faced with the thankless and hazardous task of keeping the Indian in line. When the red man revolted, escaped from the reservation, and went on the warpath, it was the officer and soldier who had to pursue and capture or kill him. The average officer and soldier knew little about the Indian, and he either learned as he campaigned or he did not long survive. Once the Indian was on the warpath, the Army approached the Indian problem solely from the tactical point of view. In order to assist the Army officer in accomplishing this approach, white men or half-breeds who had spent years living with or near the Indian tribes, were employed to serve as guides. In essence, these individuals brought to the military command a practical knowledge of Indian ways, culture, and habits that no one other than they possessed. In view of this situation, each commander in the field had his favorite guide always at his side. Generally, the advice of the guide was essential to the success or failure of the commander and his troops. Among famous and well-known guides were William F. Cody (Buffalo Bill), Charley Reynolds of Custer fame, Frank Grouard, Wild Bill Hickok, Pawnee Bill, Moses Emree Milner (California Joe), "Portuguese" Philips, and others. On the negative side, the presence of these Indian "experts" had the effect of freeing the military professional from acquiring the knowledge personally. Hence, there was too much dependence upon them for information and military intelligence vital to operations in the field (Ref 36).

On the positive side, there were certain officers and men in the Army who realized the need of personal knowledge of the enemy. With long service in the field, these individuals became proficient in Indian sign language and understood the Indian culture and character well enough to deal effectively with the Indian. But they were rare. At West Point the Military Academy curriculum offered none of the studies related to the

Indian problem, such as anthropology or cultural differences. If the individual, officer or soldier, was motivated in this direction it was usually because of his own intelligence and abilities. With a continuing insurgency, the military profession left the complete understanding of the insurgent to the civilian guide and illiterate, but adroit, frontiersman (Ref 37).

However, there were other approaches toward an acceptable solution of the Indian problem confronting the nation and the politicians in the national government in Washington. Historically, the American Indian had been the recipient of the ministrations and spiritual guidance of various Christian sects and their missionaries in the field. Indeed, some of the first and most valuable information about certain Indian tribes was gleaned from the experiences of white Christian missionaries, of both Catholic and Protestant faiths. The record of the missions was good, but from the earliest days the missionary achievement was marred by murder and torture of the missionaries at the hands of their charges. During the Plains Wars, the Society of Friends (Quakers) entered into the administration of Indian affairs. Using the Golden Rule as the basis for their dealings with the Indians and the Government Indian Agents on the job at the various reservations, the Quakers soon found that they were beyond their depth. The Friends soon found that the Indians were not only "children of nature" but savages as well!

Notwithstanding the good intentions of the humanitarians among the various religious groups, the Indian was not amenable to control and direction. That these persons who sought to control the Indian through kindness and humanity alone were in for disappointment is well explained by the comment of Colonel Richard I. Dodge, the foremost Army authority of the day:

Eastern people, educated by reading Cooper's and other similar novels, to a romantic admiration for the "red man"; misled by the traveller's tales of enthusiastic missionaries, or the more interesting statements of agents and professional humanitarians; and indulging in a philanthropy safe because distant, and sincere because ignorant, are ready to believe all impossible good, and nothing bad, of the "noble savage."

The western frontier people who come in contact with him, who suffer from his depredations, and whose life is made a nightmare by his vicinity, have no words to express their detestation of his duplicity, cruelty and barbarism. No amount of reason, no statement of facts, will ever change the opinion of either eastern or western people on this subject (Ref 38, p 22).

In the military profession as well as civilian pursuits, the attitude of the individual is all important with relationship to performance and accomplishment. The Army officer of the period of the western Indian wars was no exception to this situation. As a professional soldier, he

had received his education at the Military Academy, at a civilian university, in the "school of war," or in the "school of hard knocks." The quality of the personnel retained in the post-Civil War Army was generally good; however, there was a problem of elimination of the inept and unfit from making a career of the military profession. The following comment upon officer selection is significant:

Officer selection became a problem, soon solved. At first, the lieutenants of the new Regular Army came entirely from the wartime volunteers; higher officers came in equal numbers from the Regular Army and the Volunteers, distributed geographically according to the number of troops furnished by each region. The grab bag system made it difficult to cull out the proper officers from the hundreds who would have made the Army a vocation. Within three years the army met the problem of officer selection with a "Benzir Board" which in 1869 cleansed the army of incompetent and unfit officers (Ref 38, p 24).

The influx of newly appointed officers, after the Civil War, created a "New Army." Many of the professionals, particularly of the higher field grade ranks, had served in the conventional Civil War as general officers. The lower ranking company grade officers, many of whom had not seen war service, were graduates of the Military Academy or were appointed directly from civil life. They were inexperienced in countering the insurgency on the plains. They had received little education, instruction, or training that would fit them to cope with the "wily savages," "the world's best light-cavalrymen." The Military Academy had prepared them to function in the area of conventional war. In the course of their studies they had learned little of the humanities and the social sciences but they were drilled in the precision of engineering and artillery mathematics. Further, the West Point graduate had been subjected to a rigid daily schedule of disciplined, almost monastic, living for a four-year period. All this traditional background for the military profession did little toward fostering creativity and imagination in the average graduate. But there were exceptions, as noted. There were officers whose intellectual curiosity and intelligence enabled them to recognize and understand the nonviolent nuances of the military art.

Eventually, the Army took positive steps to use the tracking and trailing skill of the Indian against the insurgents by enlisting their "friendly" brothers as Indian Scouts in the United States Army. These Indians were in US uniform, armed, and placed under the command of Army officers. Often the members of the Indian Scouts were tribesmen who were at odds with the Indians of other tribes on the warpath against the whites. The Indian Scouts were trained to fight as a unit, or act as individual scouts when required. The idea of enlisting the aid of the Indian in the struggle of the whites against the tribes was basically sound and in addition was excellent propaganda and astute psychology. During the Civil War period on the western plains, an entire battalion of Indians

was organized among the braves of the Pawnee tribe in Nebraska. Designated as the Pawnee Battalion, it was under the command of Major Luther North, a white man and a skilled scout. The battalion performed excellent service in keeping order among the Plains Indians while the bulk of the Army was heavily engaged in the campaigns of the Civil War in the south and the east (Ref 39, pp 122-128).

The arming of friendly Indians as soldiers, or Indian Scouts, was a partial solution to problems of knowledgeable manpower. The Army needed all the assistance it could get if it was to cope successfully with the Indian. However, it must be noted that the institution of the Indian Scout was connected primarily with the delivery of violence. In a sense he was to be considered as a connecting link between the white and red cultures, but only in connection with the waging of combat, or the securing of intelligence for the white soldiers.

The political factors of the Indian Wars of the west were not understood too well by either the Army officers or the politicians and bureaucrats who made the policy in Washington, the home of the "Great White Father" of the American Indian. Treaties and councils were made and held between the Indians and the white men but they seemed to be often broken, or proved meaningless in the face of the advancing frontier. There were those among the whites who disregarded all rights of the Indian on the premise that "the only good Indian is a dead Indian." This cliché solved nothing and explains clearly the inability of certain segments of the population to cope with the political factors. Major Eben Swift says it well and with candor:

Civilization approached the American Indian with a Bible in one hand and a paper treaty in the other, a bludgeon in her sleeve, and a barrel of whiskey in her wagon, not to mention the blight that goeth unto the third and fourth generation. The task of the soldier was to punish the Indian when he applied his crude ideas of justice or revenge, and to force him to obey when he could not be cajoled or scared (Ref 40, p xii).

The Indian Wars on the western plains were only a part of the duties expected of the officer and soldier of the 1870's. From all available evidence, there was no special training or orientation toward duty on the western frontier. The academic education, experience, and general military proficiency of the individual officer was expected to fit him to cope with any assignment drawn during the course of his military career. The officer from that period until World War II was indeed a generalist, not a specialist. He was supposed to be qualified for duty with troops or duty with the staff. In combat, he was the decision-maker and the soldiers looked to him for all the answers. In administrative and command duties, he was the final arbiter of the problems encountered. Ideally, the officer and noncommissioned officer of the Army met these standards. However, there were occasions when they did not possess the dedication

or the knowledge required for dealing successfully with the insurgency of the Indian. The following comment is of interest in this connection:

...the majority of army officers on frontier duty regarded the Indian service simply as police duty. You got your orders and executed them, thankful for any break in the intolerable routine of western army post life. Too often frontier posts were staffed with mediocre material, with men who had shown little aptitude elsewhere or had been derelict in duty. Beyond forcing, cajoling, or scaring the Indian, little could be expected from them.

To the discerning, however, frontier assignments offered a challenge beyond Indian fighting. The Indian was, to a few, not merely a nuisance to be eradicated or an exciting quarry to be run down, but a human being to be understood, studied, and guided (Ref 40, p xiii).

In this period in our Army's history of Indian campaigning may be found the seeds of what the modern Army officer would term "civic action." The seeds were there, but they were not nourished to fruition. This was not essentially the fault of the Army officer, but it did rest quite properly upon a base of ignorance and misinformation. Trained primarily as a weapon wielder or battle commander, the average officer or soldier who marched or rode against the Indian was ill-equipped for the struggle because he did not know his enemy. On the other hand, there were times when the Army officer played the role of good and trusted friend of the Indian (see Fig 5). It was at this point where civic action could have been initiated as a tactic or weapon against the warlike tendencies of the red man. The conflict between the Army and the Bureau of Indian Affairs became almost as bitter as some of the nameless skirmishes against the Indian.

Another and almost incredible factor distinguished the Western War. It was the one war in which the government told the Army to fight, on the one hand, and on the other sometimes fed and sheltered the enemy. The army from time to time found that the enemy took refuge from another branch of the government -- the Interior Department -- whose Bureau of Indian Affairs supervised the reservations and issued annuities, including guns, to the Indians. Cries of indignation from eastern humanitarians also caused western commanders literally to fight on two fronts -- to carry out the government policy and then defend themselves against humanitarians (Ref 38, p 21).

The military command system permits little policy-making, except upon the highest levels. This means that the junior officer carries out the policy directed by the senior officer in command. His interpretation will, of course, depend upon many factors: first and foremost, what manner of man he is and his general character. His training,




Figure 5. General Crook Could Negotiate As Well As He Could Fight

education, experience, and motivation will all contribute to his carrying out the policy directed by higher authorities. Without any standard approach to the solution of the Indian problem, other than combat, there were few alternatives open to the officer of the Indian-fighting Army. In the higher echelons of command of that day were found some of the distinguished field commanders of the Civil War. Most of them were products of the pre-Civil War Military Academy where the course of study was essentially mathematical and not oriented toward the social sciences and humanities.

Schmitt notes that:

Many superior officers were granted opportunity to exercise their talents in Indian administration. Sherman, Sheridan, Miles, Terry, Burnside, Pope, Stuart, Howard, Crook, Hood, and Merritt are but a few generals who shave-tailed on the frontier. Of this bestarred group, General George Crook was the acknowledged master. General Sherman named him the greatest Indian fighter and manager the United States Army ever had.

There were two reasons for Crook's superiority. First, he made the frontier his life work and his life hobby, not simply an interval in a career pointed toward Governor's Island or Washington, D.C. Second, he approached the problems of the frontier, the Indians, not only as a "pacifier," a representative of force, but as a humanitarian and an interested student of his job. Despite maxims to the contrary, he burned powder only when it served the longer aim of peace and understanding (Ref 40, pp xiii-xiv).

Major General Oliver Otis Howard of Civil War and Freedmen's Bureau fame was also successful in the conduct of Indian affairs. His humanitarian approach to the problem of the homeless and hungry Indian was conditioned by his extensive "civic action" with the homeless and hungry negroes after the Civil War. Skilled and able as a combat leader, he understood that violence was not the only solution to the Indian's insurgency against the Government and the white man. But General Crook was outstanding in his ability to understand the Indian and for the Indian to understand him. His address, given at West Point during the graduation of the Class of 1884, is notable for his inclusion of his ingredients for success in dealing with the Indian. He concluded:

...that "with all his faults, and he has many, the American Indian is not half so black as he has been painted. He is cruel in war, treacherous at times, and not over cleanly. But so were our forefathers. His nature, however, is responsive to a treatment which assures him that it is based upon justice, truth, honesty, and common sense; it is not impossible that with a fair and square system of dealing with him the American Indian would make a better citizen than many who neglect the duties and abuse the privileges of that proud title" (Ref 40, p xiv).

Upon General Crook's death on March 21, 1890, Captain John G. Bourke, one of his closest staff officers in the Indian campaigns commented:

The sudden death of General Crook was a severe blow to Indian management throughout the West. The Indians knew it, and their words and acts testified their debt to Three Stars. Red Cloud, the Sioux chief, expressed the thoughts of his people to Father Craft, a Catholic missionary. "General Crook came; he at least had never lied to us. His words gave the people hope. He died. Their hope died again. Despair came again." The Indians near Camp Apache "let their hair down, bent their heads forward on their bosoms, and wept and wailed like children" (Ref 40, p 301).

Historically, the Indian Wars of the United States emerge as insurgencies that were not solved by conventional warfare tactics and strategy alone. Those few commanders who understood the political factors surrounding the Indian and his problems were often able to deal with him without resorting to the use of violence. In actuality, these commanders had no formal training for the waging of counterinsurgency, as it would be termed today, but they, in many cases, did possess the imagination and the humanity and the creativity to wage other than violent wars. Where they learned this is not known. Perhaps, in their experiences, they developed understanding and compassion.

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR AND THE OCCUPATION OF CUBA

Throughout the whole history of the Army, its Medical Corps has always done its full duty and more than its duty, not only in caring for the sick and wounded but in advancing medical knowledge for the world at large (Ref 15).

The Spanish-American War was one of the first conflicts wherein the military professionals of the US Army were faced with problems more complex than those they had faced when campaigning against the Indians of the western plains. Factors such as insurgency and counterinsurgency measures raised questions about conventional military procedures. Guerrilla war, as fought in the Philippines, had considerable effect upon US Army tactics and techniques. Formal, conventional tactics were soon replaced by those of the American bushwacker and guerrilla of colonial and Indian warfare days. In the Philippines during the early 1900's the situation was somewhat comparable to the situation in Vietnam today. An insurgency had to be contained and defeated, while at the same time, civic action and nation-building activities were carried on by the Army and by the American and civil governments. Professor Janowitz notes that:

... The Spanish-American War was conducted by the Army with little more preparation than if it were engaged in a traditional expedition against the Indians. But after the easy defeat of a weak opponent, the Army faced the stubborn task of subjugating the defiant native Moros in the Philippines. In administering its new possessions, the Army learned the limitations of its operational code and the necessity of political compromise. In the aftermath of the Spanish-American War, the military profession had to deal with the full range of modern politico-military problems: political intelligence, control of guerrilla forces, military government, the arming of indigenous forces, and the terms of political settlement. If the experiences in Cuba and in the Philippines had little influence on the conduct of subsequent military operations, it was because the military had not yet developed techniques of self-evaluation and indoctrination of officers in the complexities of modern warfare (Ref 13, p 262).

The US Army entered the Spanish-American War ill-prepared and ill-equipped compared to the armies of other western nations. In weapons, particularly in the infantry, the Army was far behind. The Spanish with their smokeless-powder, reduced-caliber rifle were more modernized. In

essence, materially the Army had not changed much since the Civil War days. It is fair to note that the officer corps of the Army was a competent and well-trained one. Individually, the high quality of the professionalism of the average line or staff officer was never in doubt. However, the average Army officer had little educational or training background to fit him to deal with natives of the islands of the far Pacific or Cuba, and there was little intelligence on the areas available to him. The problem was not a breakdown of the military, but rather one of the collapse of the bureaucratic War Department in Washington when it was faced with the emergency of war (Ref 29, pp 297-298).

Inasmuch as the theaters of operations were in both tropical and semi-tropical climates, the Army was faced with an epidemic disease situation which was to become more lethal than enemy bullets. This war, while of short duration, marked the emergence of the modern United States Army from the old frontier Indian policing and fighting force of the past. New armament, improved organization of small units, and more effective tactics were some of the strictly military advances to emerge during this conflict. However, out of this period of our military history came medical and scientific discoveries and achievements by military personnel which affected the progress of the entire human race. Historically, the conquest of yellow fever, malaria, and typhoid fever by the officers of the Medical Corps of the United States Army in Cuba is singled out as an outstanding example of service to mankind by a military organization (Ref 45, pp 218-219).

One of the hazards in the Caribbean area, during the Spanish-American War was yellow fever. American troops succumbed to its ravages by the hundreds and entire regiments were hospitalized on account of its epidemic force. At this time, medical knowledge had no exact answer to the cause of yellow fever. In Cuba after the capitulation of the Spanish forces, the US Army Medical Corps began a serious study of fevers to find the cause of this scourge of armies and civilian populations.

In connection with the occupation of Cuba, mention must be made of Major Walter Reed, of the Medical Corps. (We have met him on the Western Plains a few years before.) When he went there, yellow fever was a greater peril...than...the enemy. When he left there, the danger had vanished. No one had known how this disease was transmitted. By his brilliant researches he proved that it is carried by a specific type of mosquito, and in no other way (Ref 15, p 400).

It is not the purpose of this paper to relate, in detail, the discovery or the sources of the yellow, malaria, and typhoid fevers by Major Walter Reed, Major William Crawford Gorgas, Dr. Alva Sherman Pinto, Dr. Jesse Lazear and others, but this great medical discovery by the United States Army personnel must be mentioned briefly. No better source of information on this subject exists than Walter Reed's account published in the Journal of Hygiene, April 1902, which states, in part:

The importance of the discovery that yellow fever is transmitted by the bite of a certain species of mosquito

did not fail to attract the prompt attention of the military governor of Cuba, himself a physician, formerly a distinguished member of the Medical Department of the United States Army. By this direction the theory was subjected to a practical test in the city of Havana, in which city yellow fever had not failed to make its yearly appearance during the past one hundred and forty years.

Under the efficient management of the chief officer, Surgeon-Major William Gorgas, U.S.A., the sanitary regulations were so far modified as to require that every patient having yellow fever should not only be quarantined, but that his room should be promptly protected with wire screens, so as to prevent the possibility of mosquitoes becoming infected by sucking the blood of the patient. As a second important measure, a systematic destruction of all mosquitoes in other rooms of the patient's house, as well as in adjoining houses, was at once begun, the fumes of pyrethrum being relied upon to stupefy the insects, after which they were carefully swept up and buried. In other words, Surgeon-Major Gorgas, relying upon the well-known slow progress of yellow fever, sought to destroy all mosquitoes, infected or non-infected, within a given radius of each case, while at the same time he effectually excluded all mosquitoes from access to the sick. If a secondary case occurred, the same hygienic measures were vigorously enforced along the lines indicated.

As an illustration of what has been accomplished by these newer sanitary regulations, I may say that, counting from the date when they were put into effect, viz., February 15, 1901, Havana was freed from yellow fever, within ninety days; so that from May 7 to July 1, a period of fifty-four days, no cases occurred. Notwithstanding the fact that on the latter date and during the months of July, August, and September, the disease was repeatedly reintroduced into Havana from an inland town, no difficulty was encountered in promptly stamping it out by the same measures of sanitation, intelligently applied, both in the city of Havana and in the town of Santiagode las Vegas, whence the disease was being brought into Havana (Ref 46, pp 174-176).

Once the mosquito was identified as the carrier of disease, it was a matter of enforcement of sanitary regulations and the application of oil to water barrels and the drainage or oil-spraying of pools of stagnant water. The mosquito pupae or larvae were thus destroyed and the mosquito population brought under control and gradually eliminated. With the elimination of the

carrier, the incidence of yellow and malaria fevers was reduced to a minimum. The principles of sanitation brought to Cuba by the Medical Corps of the US Army were to be most effective in other Caribbean areas as well:

By rigidly applying the principles of field sanitation and the knowledge acquired in the Cuban Occupation, malaria was quickly brought under control, yellow fever, the curse of the Tropics, was wiped out, and the Canal Zone was transformed from a pest hole to a healthy and attractive place for human habitation. Without the splendid work of the Medical Department, it is doubtful that Goethals would have had the success he did. Today, the canal stands as a lasting monument to the technical ability, discipline, and efficiency of the Army working at its best in the fulfillment of a peacetime mission (Ref 29, p 327).

One aspect of the experiments of Major Walter Reed and his associates was the voluntary submission of individual soldiers and medical personnel to exposure to mosquito bites and inoculation of infected blood serums. A number of enlisted men of the United States Army volunteered as human guinea pigs for the experiments, as shown in Figure 6. Almost certain illness and possible death awaited those who offered their arms to the mosquito. Some slept in beds and bed clothing used by those who had died from yellow fever. These volunteers exhibited a bravery and gallantry above and beyond the call of duty. Years later, their bravery was recognized by special medals presented to them by a grateful nation (Ref 47).

The dramatic civic action of the US Army in the Cuban Occupation was in the area of health and sanitation functions of the Medical Corps. But there were definite aspects of civic action and nation building in the overall occupation with its economic and political reforms inaugurated by the occupation. Here in Cuba, as in the Philippines, the United States Army was truly engaged in building a nation.

The announced policy of the occupation authorities was not to withdraw the American troops until a modicum of economic and governmental stability was established for the Cubans. The following comment is highly significant of what constituted this early act of nation building:

The close of the war with Spain did not settle the Cuban problem which had caused it. As a result of years of misrule and fighting, conditions in the island were in a deplorable state when the fighting ended. ...the United States was committed to turning Cuba over to its people. But to have withdrawn from the island before economic and political stability was established would have been both folly and evasion of responsibility. A provisional government supported by an army of occupation therefore was set up immediately headed first by Major General




Figure 6. Major Walter Reed Freed the World From the Ravages of Yellow Fever and Malaria

John R. Brooke and later by Major General Leonard Wood. It began at once the many tasks involved in the tremendous job of rehabilitation and reform: feeding and clothing the starving; caring for the sick; cleaning up the accumulated filth of centuries in the cities; restoring agricultural and commercial activity; disbanding the Cuban Army and paying its veterans; organizing municipal governments, local guards, and courts; building roads and other public works; establishing schools; and in general, preparing the people for self-government (Ref 29, p 325).

From the very beginning of the struggle the sympathies of the American people had been with the Cubans and their insurgent leader General Calixto Garcia. As the head of the insurgent forces against the Spanish occupation, he was assured of help from no less than the President of the United States.

In retrospect, Cuba was more than a newly emerging nation to be brought into the family of nations. The medical research experiments performed there by Walter Reed and his associates focussed the attention of the civilized world upon the little island and its United States Army medical personnel. Cuba became not only a symbol of freedom from disease for all mankind but it was a symbol of freedom from tyranny.

THE PHILIPPINE INSURRECTION - 1899-1901

Whenever the Americans captured a town they set up a local native government. Simultaneously the guerrillas would create a hostile "shadow" government. In almost all cases the latter governed, while the former tried to resign or tacitly refuse to exercise authority. The lives of collaborators hung by a thread.

... In fact, there had been certain ties of religion, intermarriage, language, and psychology between Filipinos and Spaniards; but between Filipinos and Americans there was hardly anything at all in common (Ref 41, pp 293-294).

After the official cessation of hostilities in the Philippines with the signing of the Treaty of Paris, 1898, the United States Army was faced with a new struggle of dissident elements among the Filipinos who although pleased to see the ancient Spanish rule broken, were not about to accept American custodianship. Their objective was independence and freedom; in search of these two ideals, they began waging bitter guerrilla war against the Americans. This they had done for centuries against the Spanish; hence, it was not difficult for them to turn against their liberators. Thus began a vicious guerrilla war that was to last, in some areas of the Philippines, for nearly fifteen years and to cost heavily in human lives and treasures. The following extract is significant of the effect of the Insurrection upon the United States Army:

The outbreak convinced the United States that a larger force was needed to meet the challenge to its control. Ten volunteer regiments were raised, and within seven months nearly 35,000 reinforcements were on their way to the islands. The fighting that followed was fashioned by terrain, climate and differences in weapons. Because of shortages in firearms the Filipinos resorted to guerrilla warfare rather than open battle. In jungle country devoid of roads, movement was difficult and surprise and ambush easy. The natives fought with bolos as often as with rifles, and their attacks were met with small arms fire and bayonet charge. Gatling guns, used effectively against the Spanish, were too unwieldy for jungle warfare. For the same reason, little artillery was used.

... Fighting was bitter and brutal with little quarter given or asked. Over 1000 separate engagements were fought, and the casualties surpassed those of the earlier period. When... fighting ended, except for spasmodic outbreaks which lasted for years, the insurrection was over. The experience of the Army in the Indian Wars where scouting, speed, surprise, self-reliance, and individual initiative

were essential to success proved so excellent a training school that, man for man, the men and officers who went through it became the equal of the best soldiers in the world (Ref 29, pp 310-311).

The overall American experience in the Philippine Insurrection differed somewhat from that of the Indian Wars in the all-out attempt made by the United States to educate the Filipino. Under Spanish rule that lack of educational advantages for the masses was one of the principal complaints made by the Filipino. Even while the guerrilla warfare was being conducted by the troops, the American civil governor of the Philippines provided for complete revamping of the less than adequate educational program then in existence. The effort put forth by the United States in this field was marked by several outstanding features. Among them was the sending of volunteer American elementary and high school teachers to the Islands to fill the vacuum left when the Spanish teachers departed at the end of the formal war. Here is a very early and most effective American experience with civic action. Concurrently with the insurrection in the Philippine countryside, American civilian school teachers were to be found teaching the three R's in little schools in the barrios. Figure 7 depicts a US soldier and civilian teaching Filipino children.

The number of trained Filipinos was entirely inadequate. Americans had to be imported. The first contingent composed of several hundred American volunteer teachers, was brought out on the United States Army transport "Thomas." They became known as Thomasites and took pride in the name. The first teachers were obliged to teach in English... If the use of English dictated the use of American teachers, it served to bring into Philippine life, at the village level, a profound influence from the outside world. The teacher was the very center of village life. He, or she, was regarded as the model of deportment, the repository of all learning, and the court of last resort. The American with very few exceptions, discharged this heavy responsibility with good grace and great success (Ref 42, pp 46-47).

The United States Army Medical Corps, the Corps of Engineers, and the line troops in the Philippines initiated the beginning of the "civilizing" process by cleaning up the country in both urban and rural areas, but the civic action aspect of the process was proliferated by the school system under the administration of the American civilian teachers. Under the Spanish rule, the church had been the center of village activities; under the Americans, the public school was able to penetrate the home and the Filipino family through the agency of the children in attendance at the local school. Of especial significance was the utilization of the school



Figure 7. Under United States Army Auspices American School Teachers Helped Educate the Filipinos

buildings as centers for community efforts directed toward better personal and public health. The school's significance is noted in the extract which follows:

The school system also played a vital role as a transmission belt in the establishment of a public health service. The school was the first point of instruction in hygiene and sanitation. It was, in the beginning, the place at which smallpox vaccination was introduced. The teachers were not usually medically trained but they had an outlook on health problems different from that which had obtained, and their pupils, in turn, became little medical missionaries in every family. The schools, moreover, were able to cooperate fully with the public health agencies that were set up and many school buildings were actually used, in part, as clinics and dispensaries.

...the influence of a school system that reached a majority of its pupils for even less than four years is enormous. In time the Filipino child learned new modes of thought and behavior. He learned something about uncontaminated drinking water and the proper disposal of waste. He learned about the toothbrush. And most of all, he learned that there was a world other than that into which he had been born. There was a chance for rapid advancement for the gifted and the ambitious. And for all there was an equality of opportunity. These were lessons that could be readily learned even if the English was difficult, and they played a vital role in the forming of a nation (Ref 42, pp 51-53).

The American Army in the Philippines was engaged in fighting a most vicious insurgency, while at the same time it was trying to conduct civic action in the matter of "civilizing" the natives. As noted, the education of the Filipino of all ages received high priority, but there were other areas where civic action was badly needed. In the Islands, public health and sanitation were almost unknown. For centuries, the Filipinos had been left to their own meager resources and under Spanish rule very little progress had been made. The following extract will explain conditions as the American Army found them:

It was apparent from the first day of the American occupation that there had to be sweeping changes and vast improvement in the health field if the Philippines was ever to enjoy freedom and even to survive as a nation.

...it is hard...to imagine the appalling health... conditions that prevailed in the Philippines at the time of the American occupation. The annual death rate throughout the islands was estimated...to be more than fifty per thousand, although vital statistics were meager. The first medical census in 1903-1904 showed it to be more than 40 per thousand in the city of Manila itself... In the city of Manila... infant mortality... was one out of every two living births and in some districts four out of five.

Tuberculosis, malaria, and the dysenteries were endemic. Malnutritional disease, especially beriberi were prevalent. The parasitic-disease incidence was beyond estimate. Hansen's disease (leprosy) was common and wide-spread. The lesions of yaws could be seen in every village. On top of this was the constant scourge of epidemic. There were 40,000 deaths from smallpox every year. And in any year when there were less than 50,000 deaths from Asiatic cholera, masses were celebrated in the churches in thanksgiving for the deliverance of the islands. Bubonic plague frequently paralyzed the ports. There was relatively little typhus, but typhoid often wiped out whole villages and came merely under the classification of "fever" (Ref 42, pp 55-56).

Confronted with much the same problem as it had faced in the Indian wars, the United States Army in the Philippines turned to some of the lessons learned during that period. As a direct means of defeating the insurgents, the Army, taking a lesson from the Indian Scouts of the Plains, began formation of friendly native Filipinos into military units under the command of American officers and noncommissioned officers. It should be noted at this point that the institution of the civilian guide or scout of Indian days was not applicable to the counterinsurgency campaigns in the Philippines at the beginning of the century. In the first place, most of the non-Filipino civilians were Spaniards or were members of religious orders occupied with their pastoral and mission duties. There were few Americans living in the Philippines at that time who could be used for cultural or intelligence indoctrination of the troops. Colonel Oliver L. Spaulding notes how the Filipinos were brought into the United States service:

... Before the end of the insurrection the number of troops reached 75,000. A beginning was made of raising Philippine Scouts, native troops -- a plan which was successful from the start, and which has given us magnificiently efficient and unswervingly loyal native army. The first Scout companies were made up of Macabebes -- a small tribe north of Manila Bay, who were hereditary enemies of the dominant tribe, the Tagalogs; but since then all tribes are represented in the ranks of the Scouts (Ref 15, p 398).

The Philippine Scouts were eventually integrated into the United States Army, and, as such, they constituted elite units in which service was much sought by officers of the old Regular Army prior to 1940. Their loyalty and fighting ability was proven forty years later in the foxholes of Batuan alongside their American comrades-in-arms (Ref 42, p 107).

In addition to the Scouts, a Filipino Constabulary was established soon after the insurgency was under control. These were Filipinos commanded by American officers, who were often old-time noncommissioned officers of the Regular Army. Constabulary units were generally stationed within the provinces and were directly responsible for all law and order outside the villages. The American officers and men with the Scouts and the Constabulary received an excellent training in counterinsurgency and civic action (Ref 43).

The Philippine Scouts and the Constabulary were military necessities, yet both organizations were more than just that. In a very real sense, they were civic action at its best. Two additional civic actions were the product and by-product of the establishment of these units. In the first instance, these units gave employment to the Filipino and identified him with the United States of America. Secondly, his enlistment and uniform contributed to good government. In his home village he became, at once, a missionary for law, order, and discipline.

The professional Army officer and soldier, when confronted with the insurgency in the Philippines, was unprepared to solve it with any other solution than conventional warfare tactics and techniques. His pattern of operation, a lesson learned, he took from the Army's experience in the Indian wars. The guerrilla warfare mounted by the insurgents was comparable to the small hard-fought skirmishes of past Indian wars. The marked similarity will be noted in the extract below:

The war in the Philippines...had settled into guerrilla warfare and brigandage of the most subtle type. The inhabitants secreted their arms in their houses, in the jungle or buried them in the ground. They would give their word that they were friends and break faith. Giving the impression that they were going about the ordinary pursuits of a peaceful life, they would lead the soldiery to believe that they were loyal. But when an opportunity offered to attack a convoy or small parties on the march, they would suddenly rise, attack with vigor, and quickly melt into the population, acting thereafter as if they had always been "amigos." Under such conditions, there could be no large actions, but the kris, bolo and spear, together with rifles, played havoc with lonely sentinels and small bands of Americans. In spite of such occurrences the Army built over 400 posts in the Islands and many miles of road (Ref 44, p 408).

Scouting, patrolling, and counterambush measures were the order of the day as the small company- or platoon-size detachments endeavored to counter the insurgency. As the struggle gradually moved out from the towns and barrios, the civic action of the American Military government began to make inroads in the ranks of the dissidents. The political factors of the insurgency were recognized and something was done to give the Filipinos those things for which they had waged bitter insurgency against the Spaniards. The appointment of a Civil Governor of the Philippines was an immediate "propaganda of the deed" victory for the Americans. By this step, the Filipinos were shown that military rule was not to be the fate of the islands.

The line officer and soldier in the Philippines, at this time, could perform little civic action except improve his own living area. There are instances of US soldiers acting as school teachers in the villages where they were stationed, but there was no prior preparation or training for the task of the soldier in civic action. Engineer troops dug out wells, cleaned the streams and streets, built roads, and purified the water under the direction of the medical officer with the troops. This was the beginning of civilian effort to clean up the country and thereby reduce the ravages of disease and pestilence which it had endured for years before and during the Spanish colonial period.

The Philippine experience of the United States Army was unique. Its most distinctive feature was that it became a social revolution actually initiated by a force whose principal means of persuasion were violent and lethal. Smith, in his Philippine Freedom, states it well when he writes:

Reduced to its essence, the American occupation was actually an experiment in a gigantic social revolution. It proposed to change the actual mores of a whole people. Rightly or wrongly, it was believed that in no other way could they become truly free and enjoy their freedom. Such a revolution would have been quite impossible without the enthusiastic cooperation of the Filipinos themselves. They were not only willing but eager to change modes of behavior and they embraced the public school system as the natural instrument for making the changes. They were not "imitative" in the derogatory sense that the term has often been applied to the Japanese. But they were ready to accept American patterns of thought and behavior and to emulate them. For one thing, the Americans had learned how to live in freedom, and that was their own goal (Ref 42, p 52).

The Philippine Insurrection was marked by severe and bitter resistance on the part of the insurgents. The United States Army was faced with two problems: first, the defeat of the insurgents; and second, the establishment of law and order in the countryside where the insurgents operated. In essence, the situation in the Philippines, in the early 1900's was comparable to the situation in Vietnam in 1967. There, the United States Army is

conducting counterinsurgency and pacification campaigns while engaging the enemy in conventional combat.

The very early civic actions mounted by the United States in the Philippines were operated concurrently with the counterinsurgency drives of the Army and the Philippine Constabulary. In the cleared areas, the effect of the educational programs provided by the Americans for Filipino school children was considerable. The establishment of schools by the Americans proved to be one of the most significant contributions toward the peace and security of the country. The good influence and example of the American school teacher was carried by the children into their homes. There they unconsciously spread the influence of the teacher in the areas of good health habits and cleanliness. But there was a further benefit. This was the contact of the family, through the children, with an outside force with ideas and ideals.

Of the greatest significance was the conduct of instruction in a new language which all students were required to learn. English replaced Spanish, the language of the "oppressors." As the language of the United States, a nation which stood for freedom, English symbolized liberty and freedom to the Filipino student in the classroom and in the home. The desire for education on the part of most Filipinos was almost a national characteristic. The Spanish occupation authorities had done little to gratify this innate craving for knowledge. For the few elite there were educational opportunities in private church-sponsored schools, but there was little opportunity for enlightenment for Juan de la Cruz, the man in the street and his children.

Initially, these civic actions were operated by the Army in the various provinces and villages under the guidance of the military governor. As soon as practicable, they were operated by the civil authorities as they took over the government functions. Civic action in the fields of health, sanitation, and control of disease continued under the supervision of the Constabulary and US Army Medical Corps personnel in the area. Pacification was a continuing process and lasted for over a decade. In the southern islands there was vicious guerrilla fighting with savage non-Christian tribes. Eventually, these were defeated by US troops and the Constabulary and their insurgency ended. In the defeat of the fanatical Moros on the island of Mindanao, there was little opportunity for a civic action approach, direct military means were required.

In the Philippine experience, the American attitude was never one of an exploiting colonial power. From the first days, United States policy had indicated that the Philippines would have their freedom when qualified. The paternal attitude of America was noted in the "little brown brother" approach to the solution of the problem of what to do with the Filipinos. Preparing the Filipinos for self-government was one of the most ambitious civic action or nation-building projects ever undertaken by any nation. In spite of the Japanese invasion and occupation of the Philippines, this promise was kept on schedule. With the country in ruins, the Philippines were again in receipt of a tremendous civic action and nation re-building program from

the American government following the return of General MacArthur with his Liberation Army.

In the beginning, the policy and attitude toward nation-building was found within the military professionals who were charged with command responsibility. With little previous experience in nation-building, these leaders planted the seeds of democracy and freedom in an alien land. The insurgency which plagued the first years of American rule in the Philippines was defeated not only by firepower but also by education, welfare, and sanitation wielded as "civic action" weapons by both military and civil governors.

POST-WORLD WAR I OCCUPATION OF GERMANY

After the Armistice on 11 November 1918, the American and Allied troops began the march into Germany for occupation purposes. The condition of the country and the morale of the German people dictated the type of occupation to be conducted. Germany, proper, had not suffered war damage, nor had she been invaded. The German people and cities had not suffered traumatic blows from air bombardment as they did in World War II. The people, in the main, had suffered mostly from malnutrition resulting from scanty food supplies. Ersatz foods, or food substitutes, were lacking in nutritional values. Milk and other foods of special value to children were in short supply.

The occupation of Germany (1918-1923) was the largest military occupation mounted by the United States Army since the occupation of Mexico (1847-1848) by the US Army under General Winfield Scott. In some respects this occupation, half a world away from Mexico and almost three-quarters of a century later, was similar. The resemblance caused US Army military government planners to look upon the earlier occupation as an acceptable pattern. The following extract from Spaulding is significant in this respect:

In Germany, authority was gently but firmly asserted from the first. As soon as the American troops entered a town, the commanding officer sent for the burgomaster, informed him that the Americans were taking over full control, and directed him to require all civil officials to continue in the exercise of their functions. If any official refused to act, a successor was appointed. In this manner the army made the march of 100 miles to Coblenz without the slightest friction. Control was extended throughout the country and machinery for supervision of the civil government was set up. No harsh measures were found necessary (Ref 15, pp 451-452).

The Commanding General of the American Occupation of Germany after World War I, was Major General Henry T. Allen, United States Army, who fitted the pattern of his predecessor in Mexico, Winfield Scott. General Allen, a thoroughly trained professional, was a graduate of West Point, class of 1882. It is of interest to note that General Allen, in addition to having served as a cavalry officer on the Plains, was an experienced diplomat. Prior to World War I he had served as Military Attache in Moscow and in Berlin. In addition to these high-level diplomatic posts, he also saw service as a brigadier general in the field in the Philippines with the Constabulary. Later he was an observer with the Japanese Army in the Russo-Japanese War. His command ability was demonstrated further in World War I when he commanded the 90th Infantry Division, and the 8th Army Corps in combat.

The Armed Forces Officer contains the following comment upon the character of General Allen:

... General Allen was infinitely considerate of the dignity of all other men, and he disciplined himself to further their growth and give them some mark of his thoughtful regard so far as lay within his power. It was because of his rich understanding of humanity, and not through a genial slackness, that he kept a tight hold on discipline. To the units he commanded he gave his own tone. He warmed men instead of chilling them with fear. Thousands returned to civil life better equipped for the passage because of what they had seen him do and heard him say (Ref 48, pp 72-73).

Military government in Germany after World War I appears to have conducted few civic actions. The basic requirements of military government for the American forces were the maintenance or re-establishment of law and order, and the insurance of general compliance of the people with the terms of the Armistice and the later Versailles Treaty. The greatest need of the Germans was food. Military government did not usually provide food directly or officially. However, there was a considerable private effort made by the American Friends or Quakers. This organization, primarily religious in nature, occupied itself upon arrival in Germany with the conduct of direct welfare work among the civilian population. The poor were fed and clothed, and medical supplies were sent to needy German hospitals. Under the military government children of pre-school and school ages were furnished a proper diet by means of a luncheon program. In addition, children were given a daily ration of hot milk and breakfast buns in the schools. This was a basic civic action; while the United States Army initiated the program, it did not operate it, exercising only general supervision. An official report indicates that:

Child relief in the American area of the occupation was initiated first by the troops and then by the Hoover Commission. The latter Commission operated in much the same manner as the American Friends (Quaker) Service Committee. The actual feeding (of the children) was begun May 6, 1920 for 10,000 undernourished children for five months.

The work reached its maximum extent in August 1920, when 80 kitchens, feeding more than 12,000 children per day, were in operation. At the beginning of 1922 over 1800 children per day were being fed from 11 kitchens. The total number of meals served in the American area during 1920 was 1,397,000, while during 1921 the number was 324,650. The total cost to December 31, 1921, was approximately \$100,000, or about 5.8 cents per meal. But for the hearty and thorough cooperation of the Germans it would have

been impossible to have conducted the work at such small cost (Ref 49, pp 97-99).

Since Germany had not been war-damaged, roads and railroads were intact, and there was little physical rehabilitation or civic action required. The greatest suffering amongst the civil population was in the lack of essential food stuff, medicines, and fuels. Figure 8 shows US Army personnel distributing food to German civilians after World War I. Sanitary conditions in the villages and the cities were often poor because of lack of manpower for maintenance. Indigenous medical facilities were meager because of the shortage of medical doctors. Medicines were scarce because of their war-time pre-emption by the German Army. But in spite of these deficiencies, the German public morale was good. This fact was evidenced by the high degree of cooperation from the German public received by the American military government officers and men.

The occupation of Germany was essentially a benign and beneficent one for the Germans and a not too difficult one for the Americans. The American military authorities were interested primarily in maintaining the status quo of local German government. With this condition achieved, there would be little likelihood of civil disorder and indiscipline. American military governors were provided for the various German political divisions such as Land and Kreis within the American Zone. The basic principle of the American occupation was to permit the elected or appointed German officials to continue in office. At first, there was some apprehension of resistance against the occupation troops, but this was soon dispelled by the good feelings and community discipline exhibited by the Germans (Ref 50). With the monarchy displaced, the rule of the people through democratic processes was soon to appear. This was a condition which the German people found strange and unusual. In this instance, the conduct of the American troops exemplified the democratic spirit of the American people. The following comment in regard to the American troops in Germany is significant:

Naturally, the Germans showed reserve and apprehension upon the arrival of the American troops, but this attitude soon changed to confidence. Our men showed and felt no hostility whatever, but their position as victors was consistently maintained. Much care was exercised, and generally with perfect success, to keep the attitude of reserved courtesy and dignity. The impression made by our men was good, and their conduct was favorably compared by the people with that of their own retiring troops. Two weeks after the occupation of Treves, one of the newspapers there said: "What is most conspicuous in the Americans is the assurance and the peaceful manner in which they perform their duties. We hear no strident sounds, and no insolence, and we see no dissatisfaction" (Ref 15, p 452).




Figure 8. In Post-World War I Germany the United States Army Distributed Food to German Civilians

United States Army officers and men were in supervisory control of the courts and other instrumentalities of government. Their conduct of their offices evidenced at least a working knowledge of civil government. Although not specifically trained for the occupation, these individuals, both Regular and temporary personnel, demonstrated that their military and civil educations had fitted them for duties other than purely military ones. Historically, every Army the United States has sent into the field has contained a resource of talent derived from the civil background of the individuals. This was especially true of the temporary, wartime officers and men. Fortunately, they were able to fit in and perform a duty for which they had never been trained by the Army.

In the simple and less complicated life of the early part of this century the demands made upon the individual in the military service were basic and elementary. Economics, political science, cultural differences were part and parcel of the background of warfare, but the average officer and soldier of World War I were not aware of their effects upon the military profession. In Germany, in 1918-1923, the United States Army participated in a nation-building experiment, creating a new German nation. As participants, the officers and men of the Army in Germany made important contributions by their example of service. In this important nonviolent military task, the Army learned lessons which were, like those of the occupation of Mexico, patterns for future military government and civil affairs actions.

WORLD WAR II

World War II saw official recognition of the importance of training for civil affairs in the United States Army. For the first time in the Army's long history, there was established a formal program of training for officers and men who were to administer civil affairs in the theaters of operations. Historically, the average Army officer or soldier had little experience in such matters and no real training in this area. This was true of the professional officers and men as well as those who were in the Army only for the duration of the war. The wartime officers and men furnished the great bulk of the personnel for civil affairs and military government. This was because many of them had come into the service with civilian experience that was readily convertible to civil-military government functions. The long-term professional officer was utilized generally as a commander and not a technician. In this instance, he was invaluable because he possessed the military leadership, organization, and discipline necessary to maintain successful field operations. As a military technician he was not prepared, without additional training, to deal in the areas of civilian control, civil affairs, and nonmilitary administration. Civil affairs needed teachers, doctors, lawyers, bankers, engineers, and social workers who could inoculate the population, collect the homeless and starving children, restore communication, get the schools started, make the water pumps work, reestablish the flow of legal currency, start the people working, and get the civil population fed, housed, and clothed in the areas through which conflict had passed. Broadly, in World War II, all this activity was termed "civil affairs." It now may be known as "civic action" or "nation building" whether it be concurrent with the fighting, an aftermath of conflict, or a separate and distinct action from the combat being waged as in Vietnam.

Military government, as conducted during World War I and the post-hostility period by the US Army, established many workable patterns of operations in this highly specialized field of nonviolent military activity. This period of our military history is notable for the fact that the Army began training for military government functions in advance of their actual need, and in anticipation of victory over the Axis powers. For the Army, this pre-planning was an achievement in itself. In no previous conflict engaging the US Army had the problems of the civilian occupants of the territories to be seized and occupied by military action been so thoroughly planned for and anticipated.

Obviously, in the rapidly expanding wartime Army, the professional, Regular officer of the combat arms was first and foremost earmarked by the War Department as a troop unit commander. Peacetime captains became lieutenant colonels and colonels almost overnight, and many colonels became general officers. Thousands of civilians became officer candidates and received intensive training to fit them to be platoon commanders. Others, because of training and particular civilian skills which were needed by the military service were commissioned directly from civil life, at ranks ranging from lieutenant to colonel. Among the latter group were those officers who were to function as civil affairs and military government officers in conquered enemy territory.

Usually, the Regular Army officer was neither interested nor trained in the skills of military government. Such an assignment could be the "kiss of death" to him as far as his professional military career was concerned. His whole life had been dedicated to training for the task of competent management of violence to be delivered against the enemies of the United States. His education at the United States Military Academy or elsewhere had not prepared him for military government. Those officers of the Regulars who were graduates of civilian universities and colleges did, perhaps, have a broader intellectual orientation toward civil affairs; however, this had generally been lost or at least not stimulated, in the long years of patient, often routinized, troop duty at the small, isolated, red-brick forts scattered about the country.

The professional officer viewed the world about him, as was to be expected, with the "military eye." His entire approach to the solution of all problems was well-grounded in the disciplined absolutism of formal mathematical training, if he was a West Point graduate. Most of the non-Academy officers had their thinking and responses similarly conditioned by long service under command of graduates of the Military Academy. Thus, the patterns for all Regular Army officers were cut pretty much from the same piece of cloth. Obedience, discipline, correct attention to details, and strict adherence to military protocol tended to blunt the spirit of creativity in the average professional officer. As a result of the system, the broad, inspired thinking and imagination required of a successful military government or civil affairs officer was not present in usable amounts in the Regular Army officer. The military educational system was centered around the waging of war. The technique of civil administration required knowledge of cultural differences and the social sciences, either not included or not heavily weighted in the curricula of the Academy or the staff or war colleges.

A further situation complicated the social attitude of the average Regular officer. This was the "splendid" isolation from the civilian world to which the Regular Army was subjected almost from its beginnings.

Opportunity for the officer to evade and escape social obligations has increased, but the patterns of etiquette and ceremony remain relatively intact. It is, of course, difficult to assess the loss of creative personnel who dislike such etiquette, or infer the impact of such practices on intellectual processes. For those who survive the acculturation of service academies, military protocol comes to be taken for granted (Ref 13, p 198).

The identification of military government as a separate and distinct form of nonviolent military activity came late in the United States Army. Traditionally, the officers and men who performed these functions during combat or afterward were the same people who operated weapons and drove wagons or trucks. In essence, military government was considered by the professional Army officer as another duty which had to be performed. As such, there were no mysteries about it and any military individual could handle the work. It will be recalled, however, that in the beginning of the US Army,

military government problems were somewhat more simple and uncomplicated than in modern times.

The people for whom the military government operated were usually helpless, homeless, and hungry; the solution to their problem lay in providing them with the basic necessities of life: food, clothing, and shelter. Once these essentials were obtained the people were satisfied, and usually amenable to direction and control. More complex and humane matters requiring the attention of military government officers began to appear during and after World War I. Among these were medical care, education, transportation, public utilities, fuel, rationing of food and clothing, public safety, public and private welfare, and religion. Professor Zink in his well-known book, Military Government in Germany comments:

In previous wars military government functions have been mainly performed by the officers and men who fired rifles and drove supply wagons. A certain military government job had to be done; so the commanding officer of combat forces on the spot detailed whatever officers and men were available at the moment to handle this work. Sometimes officers found themselves given more or less permanent assignments to this sort of duty, but even in such cases little or no provision was made for their training nor was much attention paid to their previous civilian background which might fit them for such tasks. Military government problems were comparatively simple in most cases and this arrangement worked out reasonably well (Ref 51, p 2).

In the initial phases of World War II, the planners in the War Department at Washington were aware of the lack of military government talent within the ranks of the Regular service. Hence, they were faced with the problem of training the Regular and the non-Regular, temporary, wartime officers in the basic principles of military government. As is usual in a national emergency, repositories of knowledge and information, such as universities, were soon involved in the war effort, and World War II was no exception. The campus of the University of Virginia became the site of the official United States Army Military Government School. The curriculum at the University of Virginia and at Fort Custer, Michigan, where a Civil Affairs Training School (CATS) was organized for the basic training of those officers appointed directly from civil life

...combined general military indoctrination with courses intended to prepare officers for military government assignments. In the general policy courses officers learned something of military law, military policing, military security, aircraft identification, the problem of supply, Army correspondence, the Army postal system, military courtesy, and almost everything else military in character.

... The military government side of the curriculum consisted of military government, the mission of military government, public administration, and the people, geography, and institutions of the people of a certain area: Germany, Italy, France, and so forth. Though Charlottesville did little with language instruction during its early classes and perhaps never emphasized language a great deal, the CATS placed heavy stress on the study of the language of the area in which an officer expected to be assigned (Ref 51, p 9).

As the war progressed, the military government officers were busily occupied with operations in North Africa. There they were eminently successful and demonstrated their worth, and the program of instruction was expanded by the War Department. Now, Fort Custer and the various universities amplified the training by enrolling hundreds of officers who were surplus to the Army's needs, because of age or unit reorganization. Most of these officers were temporary, wartime appointees, or Reserve Officers on active duty. There were a few Regulars to be found in each class, but they were in the minority. Zink explains that arrangements

... were made to send several hundred officers recruited both from surpluses in various Army units and from civil life to Fort Custer, Michigan for a month's training in military government. At the conclusion of the month at Fort Custer these officers were distributed among CATS (Civil Affairs Training Schools) on various campuses including Harvard, Yale, Pittsburgh, Boston, Michigan, Northwestern, Western Reserve, Wisconsin, and Stanford Universities. Here they normally remained for two months. At the conclusion of that time they were sent abroad...

With almost no previous experience to serve as a guide, the instruction of the civil affairs officers had to be set up on an experimental basis (Ref 51, p 7).

The situation described below by Professor Zink may be used to point up the absolute necessity of recognition of the importance of nonviolent military activities in wartime. The recognition might take the form of promotion to higher rank of those qualified in the fields of military government, civil affairs, and civic action. A career pattern for individuals who are proficient in these areas would have prevented or alleviated the situation described below. In time the Army would have possessed enough senior officers whose education had been both tactical and nontactical. They would have possessed the ability to be ambidextrous and, as such, would have been distinct assets to the furtherance of the war effort.

When the US forces entered Germany, military government... drew, at least, a full share, and probably more than a fair share, of the senior colonels of the

regular army. Here were officers who had many professional experiences in the Cavalry and other tactical branches of the Army and who knew every jot and tittle of traditional military procedure. But they lacked breadth of vision or sound judgment or adaptability, with the result that they were left as colonels while their juniors, the Eisenhowers, the Bradleys, and many others became brigadier generals, major generals, lieutenant generals, and even full generals... At any rate those who were shuffled off on military government presented many complications. Most of them had little or no respect for this new-fangled military activity: prestige to them meant assignment to a tactical unit. To them the running of a military government headquarters in Germany was substantially the same as operating a truck driver's school or an airfield in the United States... they obviously constituted a fairly heavy liability, especially when they concentrated their attention on jockeying for personal power, knocking the efforts of specialist military government officers down, and making themselves generally "difficult" (Ref 51, pp 28-29).

The administration of military government during World War II was marked by many new and strange situations, among them the fact that the United States was fighting a global war. Such a widespread activity meant that military government functions must be prepared to operate in every climate and environment. Languages, customs, cultural differences, national institutions, and national character helped to influence the training of those who were to administer military government for the United States Army. Obviously, this was a tremendously important mission to be performed by personnel who had to be hastily selected and trained for the job. An attempt at geographical area specialization was made in teaching selected individual officers linguistics and cultural and environmental aspects of a given area within the Axis territory. Assuming the area captured and under control of United States or Allied forces, the area-trained military government personnel were to be moved in with area-qualified and knowledgeable people in command. The "linguistic gap" of the average American was to be closed by highly compressed language instruction. The successes and failures of the program are noted by Zink:

No doubt many officers made a good start in acquiring a knowledge of certain languages; some with special aptitude or the advantage of a previous foundation, finished the courses with real ability to use the language as a tool. But the great majority of the officers never acquired enough of any foreign language to be able to use it with any degree of facility (Ref 51, p 10).

Military government in World War II was almost automatically divided into two principal classes: urban and rural. Further division by climate created tropical, arctic, and temperate zone operations. In the Philippines,

the military government problem was complicated by a very large rural area covered with jungles and occasional swamps and mountains. But one of the distinct assets was the fact that the native population was almost completely loyal to the United States. In the Sixth United States Army zone of operations on the island of Luzon, the Philippine Civil Affairs Units (PCAU) teams were attached. Bearing some resemblance to military government units being employed in Europe

... Many of the PCAU's were partially staffed by expatriate Filipinos from the United States. Their responsibilities included supervising the distribution of relief supplies, setting price ceilings and directing the retailing of consumer goods, reestablishing schools and medical facilities, and reconstituting the local governments. Since the vast majority of Luzon Filipinos were loyal, the PCAU's could expect cooperation. Each PCAU boarded ship with the maximum quantity of relief supplies it could squeeze into the cargo space allotted it. GHQ SWPA (General Headquarters, South-West Pacific Area) provided for a bulk shipment of 4,000 tons of relief supplies to reach Luzon on S plus 18, and within another month and a half some 16,000 more tons would arrive on Luzon. Suitable captured Japanese supplies would be distributed to the needy, and in an emergency the PCAU's could call upon the Sixth Army to provide food and medical supplies (Ref 52, pp 40-41).

The modus operandi of the Philippine Civil Affairs Units was, more or less, a standard procedure. Highly compact, mobile, and commanded usually by a major, the team might comprise a total of thirty military and civilian personnel. The civic action portion of the units work was begun the moment the attacking tactical unit arrived at its objective. Civil affairs units were generally on the job within minutes of the driving out of the enemy and the securing of the area by the combat troops. Usually, PCAU's accompanied the attacking troop units or were moved in after the successful combat units had moved forward or had broken off contact with the enemy. The official history of the Leyte Campaign indicates that:

... As soon as the conflict had passed by an area, a civil affairs unit of the Sixth Army stepped in and started to restore normal community life. Temporary appointments of Filipino officials were made, such appointments going to men who had been screened by the Counter Intelligence Corps or who were sponsored by Filipinos whose loyalty was unquestioned. In nearly every case the Philippine Commonwealth ratified these appointments. In every area reached by the Sixth Army, civil officials were appointed as soon as the tide of battle passed, and without exception cordial relations were established. The civil affairs officers of the Sixth Army did not attempt

to interfere with civil operations unless requested to do so, or unless the military situation made it necessary (Ref 53, p 200).

In the Philippines the Army was faced with a refugee problem which was not of the magnitude of that faced by American troops in the European Theater, or later in Korea. However, the Filipino civilian refugees were by tradition bound to their villages and, even before the fighting in an area was at an end, they streamed back to try to retrieve some of their pathetic items of property. Once in the villages, the refugees constituted serious problems of feeding, housing, and medical care. Because of the church- and school-centered culture in the Philippines, the village priest or the teacher and the church compound or school were usually the key personages and areas connected with rehabilitation activities. The PCAU teams, as noted, were in the area before the firing had ceased and in operation within a matter of hours. Basic matters such as burial of the dead, both enemy and friendly, was the first order of procedure to keep down the spread of disease. These basic civil actions were accomplished in the following manner by the PCAU teams on the island of Leyte in the village of Palo. The following account is of interest because it contains many of the activities which are now carried out in the name of civic action or internal development:

The Army fed... refugees from captured stocks of rice and appointed a force of civilian police. After a survey of the area, the Army instituted sanitary measures for cleaning up the church and its compound, with the removal and burial of dead animals. Civilian laborers who had been checked for their loyalty undertook the burial of American and Japanese dead and the unloading of ships in the harbor. The Army disarmed all Filipinos except guerrillas and enforced security regulations, which prohibited civilians from appearing on the street after dark. As more military units entered the town, 5,000 of the refugees were moved to its outskirts. The Army set a hospital in the compound and surgeries in the school houses, with separate wards for men and women. Teachers and other qualified women assisted as practical nurses. Within one week the Army had organized the town and begun work toward rehabilitation (Ref 53, p 201).

One of the most important activities of the PCAU team was centered around the village school. While the area was under occupation by the Japanese forces, the school curriculum was purged of every item pertaining to the basic tie of the Filipino to the American culture. School texts were destroyed and Japanese-edited books substituted. The Japanese language was taught and school teachers and children were forcibly indoctrinated in the propagandistic philosophy of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, as envisioned and put into practice by the Japanese armed forces. When there was a threat of combat, the schools were closed and the pupils dispersed to the barrios outside the larger villages. Since the Japanese were prone

to use schools and churches as strong points, these buildings were often partially destroyed by the artillery and mortar fires of the attacking American troops. The immediate effect of the PCAU's upon the school systems throughout the Islands may be noted in the extract below:

The civil affairs units of the Sixth Army opened about 500 schools in the principal barrios, those in Tacloban (Leyte) being the first to open. Many school buildings were either rebuilt or repaired under the direction of civil affairs officers and with funds furnished by them. Since there were no primary textbooks, in one instance the civil affairs units mimeographed a series of three school books which were illustrated by an Army artist. The teachers of Leyte not only provided excellent service in school work but also acted as relief workers, sanitarians, and assistants in the dispensaries and hospitals (Ref 53, p 203).

In the European area, in the Southwest Pacific, in the Philippines, and in the other islands in the Pacific Ocean, military government performed an essential and necessary nonviolent military activity during World War II. The operations of US Army military government and civil affairs teams were marked by their humanitarian approach to the problem. On operational levels such an approach was possible and practicable because of the training and indoctrination received prior to commitment to the mission. Trained civil affairs and military government personnel possessed the necessary understanding, knowledge, and dedication for accomplishment of their unusual and difficult missions. They had to be trained hastily and often incompletely to do the job. Their task was an unmilitary one, and unpopular because it did not wage combat with the enemy. But as military personnel, the civil affairs and military government officers and men were fighting an enemy more deadly, more insidious than man. The foes they conquered were hunger, pestilence, moral degradation, and decay. By their work they were instrumental in helping restore hope in those they served. (see Fig 9).

World War II experience in nonviolent areas of military activity indicated conclusively that trained personnel are required to administer its many-faceted activities. The hurried, improvised, and often piecemeal training provided by the US Army during World War II was the best and most effective offered up to that time. Recognition by the military of the need for specialists in the fields of military government and civil affairs was long overdue (Ref 54).

The need for trained officers and men in the fields of military government and civil affairs was recognized in the post-war reorganization of the United States Army. Basically, the custodianship of the professionalism of military government and civil affairs was vested in the office of The Provost Marshal General of the Army. Tables of Organization and Equipment provided no active units in the Regular Army, but military government personnel and units were found in the Army Reserve organization.



Figure 9. A World War II Military Government/Civil Affairs Team in Action

THE KOREAN WAR

Military operations of the future could find us in situations comparable to those in Korea where sympathetic ideologies exist but where material means for the support of a united military effort are lacking (Ref 57).

The Korean War (1950-1953) furnished innumerable opportunities for the United States Army to conduct civil affairs and military government activities. At the very outset of the struggle, the Korean countryside was flooded with thousands of refugees fleeing from the advancing Communist North Korean Army. The Republic of Korea looked to the United States for help in repelling the invasion. Such assistance in the form of military units was deployed from Japan and the birth of the United Nations Command soon followed with troops of certain signatory United Nations members participating in lesser or greater numbers. The bulk of the United Nations troops were furnished by the United States and the Republic of Korea and the "police action" soon grew into a full-scale war in which hundreds of thousands of United States Army soldiers were engaged (Ref 55).

For the purpose of background history, it must be noted that the United States Army had been represented in Korea in the interim between the end of World War II and the onset of the Korean Conflict. This most invaluable contact was through the activities of the Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAC) which functioned in an advisory capacity to the Republic of Korea. Initially, the indigenous troops in South Korea were organized and trained as a constabulary force which, of course, proved to be inadequate for defense of the country. However, during this time, the Americans with the Koreans did perform many civic action functions in addition to their regular military advisory tasks. Among these actions were the building of village schools and the organization and operation of orphanages for homeless children from the World War II period. This extracurricular activity on the part of the Americans of the first KMAC served to establish a pattern of civic action that persisted throughout the war and in the post-Korean War period. With the advent of full-scale combat from June 1950 on, such activity was amplified because of the refugee problem and the almost constantly shifting tide of battle (Ref 58). Once the combat situation became more or less stabilized, all units of the United Nations forces conducted local civic actions from the feeding of starving civilians and refugees to the unit "adoption" of orphanages and elementary schools (Ref 56).

Thousands of children who had lost their families wandered with the refugees. Orphanages within the country rounded them up and cared for them, receiving aid from the Civil Assistance Command. In addition, thousands of American soldiers voluntarily contributed money to support homes for them. Many units of the Eighth Army "adopted" orphanages, supporting them with money, clothing, food, and other necessities. Another objective of the civil relief mission in Korea was to assist the

country in rebuilding its economy. The Civil Assistance Command helped to rebuild and expand the agricultural economy by providing technical guidance and material aid. At the same time the South Koreans were helped and encouraged to build factories for the production of war material and consumer goods, and the nation's government took steps to reduce inflation. This economic program was reinforced by the Eighth Army's employment of thousands of Korean workers and the rebuilding and improvement of the railroads, highways, ports, and airfields of the country (Ref 55, p 215).

Medical care was a major problem which in some instances was taken over by volunteer foreign hospital and medical units. Obviously, the tasks of welfare, relief, and civic action were too involved and complicated for the combat units to carry on alone in addition to fighting. In order to close the gap and solve the problems of the rear areas of combat, the Eighth United States Army organized the United Nations Civil Assistance Command Korea (UNCACK).

As the Eighth Army moved northward, UNCACK furnished each of the provinces and the city of Seoul, as they were liberated, with civil assistance teams - ultimately ten in number - which implemented the policies and performed operations of both the headquarters and the government in each of the provinces. This assistance was provided as far forward as the corps rear boundaries the Eighth Army.

Forward of these boundaries the Eighth Army administered the program through its own Civil Affairs and Military Government channels (Ref 57, p 31).

The United Nations Civil Assistance Command Korea was based upon the United States Army's experience with civil affairs and military government in World War II. To supplement this experience refresher courses in civil affairs and military government were conducted by the Army at Fort Gordon, Georgia. However, UNCACK was essentially a military organization. As the situation wore on and the war progressed, the Command was assisted greatly by the addition of American civilian experts and local indigenous personnel. The latter group was especially useful as interpreters and as school teachers when the schools were rebuilt. But the mission of UNCACK was a broad one and civil assistance to wartorn Korea was a large order. Here, in essence, was the military professional heading a nonmilitary activity as an essential concomitant of the combat operation. In a real sense this was a gigantic task of nation building or rebuilding.

Besides giving logistical support to the South Korean Army, the Eighth Army aided the civil population with relief supplies. From the very beginning of the conflict the Republic of Korea required civil assistance for its population. As the fighting spread over the whole country, the destruction of homes and fields, economic dislocations, and threats of disease and starvation imperiled the new nation. The South Korean Government did not have the means to cope with the problems of its tens of thousands of homeless refugees. Unless something was done, civil unrest would seriously impair the military effort of the U. N. forces in Korea. Thus civil relief became a military problem, at least while the fighting continued. When the U. S. Army received responsibility for providing civil assistance to the Republic of Korea, it moved quickly. The Far East Command shipped food, clothing, and medicine from its supply depots to care for the refugees. Other relief items were purchased from Japanese sources. The Eighth Army organized the United Nations Civil Assistance Command (UNCAACK) to provide relief. Working with the South Korean Government and U. N. representatives, this command supervised the organization of refugee camps, distributed food and clothing, and established medical facilities for the civil population. To prevent the spread of communicable diseases, more than three-fourths of the population received inoculations against small pox, typhoid, and typhus. Aircraft dusted cities with DDT to kill disease-bearing insects while teams dusted millions of South Koreans (Ref 55, p 215) (Figure 10 shows a U. S. Army-sponsored DDT plane in action in Korea).

In Korea, the professional soldier was faced with the problem of operating a nonviolent activity of great importance to further the war effort. This activity was begun almost concurrently with United Nations military operations. The effect of these efforts to feed, house, and clothe the refugees was that the resources of manpower and materials, and the human values they represented, were preserved as a moral reserve with which to combat the enemy. Of greatest consequence was the concern engendered within the Republic of Korea Army itself, with the troops not knowing the fates of their home villages and families, wives, and children. This situation was an intolerable one and one that, if allowed to persist, could have completely destroyed the individual and collective morale of the South Korean Armed Forces. The field teams of the new Korean Civil Affairs Command were the principal means of carrying out the program of alleviating some of this concern. The following comment in regard to the composition and size of the KCACK teams is of interest:

Although the size of each team may differ with locale, the typical team averages slightly over 20 persons, plus Korean personnel. Each team is comprised of five officers and an equal number of civilian technicians and enlisted men.



Figure 10. A United States Army-Sponsored DDT Plane in Action in Korea

Retaining some identity in internal makeup with the headquarters KCAC, the field teams utilize both military and civilian personnel to coordinate assistance projects with local officials. With sections dealing in public health, welfare, housing, sanitation, and agriculture, specialists therein are utilized to assist the speedy and efficient execution of the Civil Assistance Program as it affects the individual province. In addition to giving on-the-spot relief to any area stricken by disaster, the results of their work offer a "grass roots" example of what cooperation can mean to the Korean people in their struggle to build a stable economy (Ref 57, p 31).

Of considerable interest to the student of civil affairs and civic action is the fact that the United States Army in Korea became involved not only in welfare and relief activities, but in the economic aspects of the South Korean Republic as well. Here, in essence, was a nation-building, or rebuilding program conducted under fire. In addition to combatting the enemy, the Eighth United States Army and the United Nations troops had to feed, clothe, and house the refugees and reconstitute the destroyed economy. There were natural products, such as coal and other minerals, the processing of which had been halted by the conflict. Transportation systems, old and new rail lines, and destroyed bridges all required servicing which the Korean economy could not furnish. War-destroyed harbors and ports required rehabilitation in order to serve the war effort and the civilian economy. Destroyed villages in the war zone required rebuilding after the battle had receded, or advanced. These activities were basically civil affairs and military government operations but the concurrent combat environment made them a bit different and unusual in American experience. Colonel James E. Mrazek in his cited article, "Civil Assistance in Action," has drawn most valuable lessons for the present and future from the Korean experience. His summary is so well done that it must be quoted in toto for one to see in it the seeds of the civic actions of the present day.

The experience derived from the administration of the Civil Assistance Program in Korea should be valuable. Since we must do our utmost to husband our resources in manpower, money, and materials, it behooves us to place maximum reliance on the human and available material resources of the country in which we are operating, to the extent that they carry the burdens of their own problems, with the minimum of aid and assistance we deem necessary to assure a military operation unhampered by problems in rear areas. In terms of accomplishments versus energies expended, the Civil Assistance Program in Korea has been a profitable enterprise. We have enabled the fighting forces to operate without undue concern for the hidden enemies of disease and unrest lurking dangerously close in the civilian population; we have assisted in stabilizing

a country socially, economically, and politically, and finally, we have developed a strong and willing ally. We must endeavor to achieve as a minimum these particular objectives in any area in which we operate (Ref 57, p 36).

The Korean War exemplifies the somewhat unusual military situation wherein the soldier must fight and at the same time rebuild and maintain a foreign ally. The basic assistance given to the Republic of Korea by the United States and the United Nations was essentially military. The non-military assistance was conceived as necessary if the Korean nation and its people were to survive the ravages and destruction of invasion, poverty, and disease. Concurrently with the fighting, the Korean Assistance Command operated nonmilitary activities in order to preserve and reestablish the remnants of the Korean republic. This activity was administered by US Army officers and men. Under the overall command of a United States Army general officer, this hastily organized but badly needed headquarters and its field units began to solve the refugee problem by housing and feeding them. Whenever possible, refugees were employed by the Army as laborers, clerks, and mechanics to assist in the war effort.

This basic assistance helped to relieve the terrible sufferings of the refugees. However, there was a real problem encountered in the matter of economic and agricultural stability. Without rice, the Koreans would starve. This was their staple food. Hundreds of thousands of rice-producing peasants were driven from their land by the enemy. The result was a shortage of rice and the constant threat of starvation for the entire civilian population. Rice could not be imported in sufficient quantities. Under the supervision of the Assistance Command, Korean farmers were soon growing it in the south. Seed and fertilizer were distributed throughout the southern provinces, and agriculture was maintained at an acceptable production level while combat was waged. New homes and villages were built for the resettled farmers, and schools and orphanages were constructed. Provincial governments were supervised by American and United Nations economic and political advisors, both military and civilian, from the Korean Civil Affairs Command.

The Korean Civil Affairs Command, as the Assistance Command was termed later, performed vital civic action. With the civil population provided for by the actions of the Command, stability, political and emotional, was assured within the various segments of the people. As always, the Communists were out to win converts to their ideology. The best defense against such adverse persuasion was the civic action and relief measures carried on by the United States Army and the United Nations Command. Usually, people who are fed, clothed, housed, and employed are not profitable targets for subversive propaganda. Further, the fact that the home population was being taken care of gave the morale of the Republic of Korea soldier a boost. Worry about what is happening at home can destroy the morale of a single soldier or, collectively, the morale of an army. In Korea, civic action, or

civil affairs as it was then termed, was a vital weapon against Communist promises and blandishments directed against the people in the rear of the battle area (Ref 58).

The effectiveness of civil affairs in Korea may be ascribed to two factors, the experience of the Army in World War II, and the leadership of those officers entrusted with its execution at rice paddy level. Their ability, as military professionals, to function in a nonmilitary activity, gave strength and direction to the project. Further, it increased the quality of their professionalism because it demonstrated their versatility in operating effectively in either violent or nonviolent military activity.

In 1956 the civil affairs function was separated from military government and placed under a Chief of Civil Affairs, Army General Staff. The Provost Marshal General retained the Military Government activity. Currently Civil Affairs are conducted by the Civil Affairs Directorate in the Office of Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Department of the Army.

VIETNAM

It has been said that the United States is engaged in two wars in South Vietnam. In the fighting war -- the familiar war -- men kill and are killed. In "the other war... the quiet war," the men who battle on our side do not kill, but they may be killed. For the war in South Vietnam is being waged in differing ways: to save a country, and to build a nation (Department of State).

The United States has been involved in Vietnam since the Indochina war there nearly sixteen years ago. At that time, our involvement consisted primarily of direct financial and materiel aid to the French in their bitter struggle against the Viet Minh. After their tragic defeat at Dienbienphu, the French gradually withdrew from Vietnam. A limited number of American military advisors were assigned to assist the French and the Vietnamese. At this point in the Vietnam experience, the function of the American advisors was to assist the Vietnamese in the building of a proper armed force for the defense of their country.

It is not the purpose of this paper to relate the history of the present conflict in Vietnam. Rather, its purpose is to point up the varied roles of the US Army officer and enlisted person in the performance of their service in that area. In order to clarify the initial war situation in Vietnam, it is necessary to recall that the United States was obligated by treaty to help preserve and protect South Vietnam. Protection from infiltration and take-over by the Communistic regime of Ho Chi Minh was the basic mission. In order to do this advisory activities to the indigenous forces on the part of US Army personnel were deemed adequate at first. But the effect of the persistent Viet Cong infiltration and insidious propaganda was to create and maintain an active insurgency in South Vietnam against the South Vietnamese government. Supplied with weapons and ammunition from the North, and with food secured by terror tactics exerted against the villagers of South Vietnam, the insurgents posed a serious threat.

To understand the situation in Vietnam, one must recall the Hukbalahap insurgency in the Philippines after the end of World War II. A Communist party of minor size was winning the peasants over by both terror and "gentle persuasion." But principally, the Filipino peasants were going over to communism because they were not able to get what they felt was their due from the government. The Communist propaganda line, with its promises, was effective to the point where the elected government was about to be toppled. Conventional military tactics were ineffective against the insurgents, primarily because the insurgents were fighting as guerrillas. Further, the guerrillas were being supported by the populace, either willingly or unwilling. Entire villages and the countryside of provinces of the Philippines were infected by the Communist insurgency.

Concurrent with the insurgency in the Philippines was the insurrection against British rule in Malaya. Out of both these areas of insurgency came a new approach to solving the encroachment of guerrilla movement into the countryside, the villages, and cities. Both the British and the Filipinos

were forced to devise new methods of countering their respective insurgencies. These methods were often unorthodox and unmilitary but they worked! The military profession in search of an answer to Communist or other insurgency which was becoming epidemic throughout the globe began to look into the background of the Malayan and Filipino successes against the Communist guerrillas.

In the Philippines Ramon Magsaysay, a former World War II Filipino guerrilla captain, became Secretary of Defense of the Republic of the Philippines. His astute and correct appraisal of the Hukbalahap insurgency was that basically not all Huks were Communists. Some had been impressed by terroristic tactics and were not hard-core Communists; however, there was also a large group of good Filipinos within the Huk insurgency movement who were there only because of political factors. Magsaysay decided that it was possible to counter insurgency with other than military or violent tactics. In reality, his new tactic was "civic action" and it was based upon subtle but practical operations conducted by the troops in order "to make friends and influence people" in favor of the de jure government.

While Magsaysay realized the political implications of the Huk revolt required an indirect solution... he did not hesitate to use direct military means to that end. However, he instituted certain measures which were psychological rather than military. Because he knew that many of the Huks were good Filipinos who had been driven to guerrilla actions by their abject poverty, the Secretary of Defense tried a new tactic in countering the insurgency. He offered them government land and new homes, if they would surrender. This tactic which became known as "Civic Action" was, in reality, a psychological one and it forms the basis for much of our present-day counterinsurgency doctrine (Ref 59).

By these actions, Magsaysay was enabled to "steal the thunder" from the Huks' propaganda of free land for those who supported their movement. As Secretary of Defense he was faced with several difficult problems: reform of the Army and the Constabulary, and dismissal of corrupt and grafting officials at all levels of the national government. It is not the intent of the paper to relate the entire history of the Filipino counterinsurgency campaigns mounted against the Huks. The historical record reveals that Magsaysay was highly successful and that eventually his work in this area made him the President of the Philippine Republic. But for his untimely death in an aircraft accident on 17 March 1957, Ramon Magsaysay's contribution to the art of counterinsurgency would have been but one of his outstanding services. It should be noted that the decisive defeat of the Huks in the Philippines was the one instance of total defeat of a Communist-inspired insurgency up to that time. In essence, Magsaysay demonstrated that there were two tasks involved in countering an insurgency: military defeat and political defeat. That operations other than conventional ones were in order was readily apparent to the Secretary. The need for non-violent action to solve the Huk problem resulted in establishment of the

Economic Development Corps operated as a branch of the Army which was "charged with the administration of land development projects for purposes of rehabilitation" (Ref 42, p 172).

These projects were tangible recognition by a government that the distribution of the advantages to be given to its citizens by their government must be reformed and equalized in order to take the effectiveness out of insurgent propaganda. In addition, all departments of the Government must be employed against the insurgency if it is to be defeated (Ref 60).

Concurrently with involvement in Vietnam on the Advisory Group level, the Army began to delve deeply into past military history for workable tactics with which to counter the insurgency which confronted South Vietnam. Historically, our troops have fought as guerrillas, fought against guerrillas, and helped support them in their unprofessional role of waging violent warfare. The professionals of all armies, for centuries, have had their orthodox methods of delivering violence in order to destroy or defeat an enemy. But twentieth century Cold War insurgency proved that the enemy could not always be crushed solely by violence. The experience of both Magsaysay in the Philippines and the British in Malaya proved this beyond a shadow of doubt (Ref 61). Our military history shows that in all wars the United States Army has demonstrated its ability to use nonviolent means in support of military ends.

The initial use of nonviolent military skills in Vietnam by the US Army was evidenced in 1960 when

...the Army sent operational detachments from the 7th Special Forces Group at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to the Republic of Vietnam, where they set up camps near villages which were plagued by the Viet Cong.

Vietnamese volunteers from nearby villages were trained in medical care, sanitation, land development, national resources and counterinsurgency. The Special Forces pitched in on some of these tasks. The detachments also developed and organized Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG) designed to strengthen local villages militarily and economically (Ref 62, pp 27-31).

The Special Forces Teams were among the first units of the modern United States Army to be trained to be professionally ambivalent; they were trained to both fight and to conduct civic action activities. The theory behind the nonviolent activities was that there would be tacit recognition of some of the economic lacks and material desires of the people of Vietnam on village level. Hopefully, with these political factors satisfied, there would be a lesser chance of the recipients responding to the blandishments of the Viet Cong propaganda. But on the other side of the coin, the villagers were also trained in the delivery of violence for defense of their homes against possible attack by the Viet Cong.

Instruction in counterinsurgency tactics and supervision of the organization and training of guerrilla bands to fight the Viet Cong on their own terms, were also part and parcel of the Special Forces package. Briefly...

The Special Forces Officer Course teaches concepts and principles of guerrilla warfare and techniques of Special Forces in cold, limited, and general war, with application of these principles and techniques in counterinsurgency and psychological operations (Ref 62, pp 27-31).

As early as 1962 numerous authorities in the field of Far Eastern affairs agreed that in the insurgency in Vietnam, as well as elsewhere, the successes of the insurgency may be ascribed broadly to the fact that they have gained control over the rural population. Community support means that

For every man in a guerrilla force carrying a rifle there must be a large number of civilians who provide the support he must have to survive and fight. They are the source of food, clothing, and recruits (Ref 63).

In Vietnam, there was recognition that United States Army personnel in the advisory role must receive training in depth. This training must be matched with "an extraordinarily high level of individual aptitude and competence." This required a

...system of training -- for both our own personnel and for those we are aiding -- comparable to that for an army officer, a physician, or an engineer (Ref 63).

Selected US officers and noncommissioned officers ordered to duty with the Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) first attend the Military Assistance Training Adviser (MATA) Course. Here they learn the essentials of advisor-counterpart relationships and counterinsurgency operations. Instruction also includes familiarization in weapons, communications, demolitions, air-ground operations, and area orientations. Linguistic ability in Vietnamese and physical fitness are also emphasized (Ref 62, pp 27-31).

The patterns of civil affairs and civic action initiated in Vietnam, aside from those carried on by Special Forces detachments, were essentially based upon those developed by the Army during World War II and the Korean War. Military government and civil affairs form the overall spectrum with civic action at village level at the lower end of the scale.

In the present era of stability operations...

...civil affairs participation consists generally of staff and team activities rather than large unit operations, although a civil affairs company supported the XVIII Airborne Corps in the Dominican Republic and

Two CA companies support US forces in Vietnam. Most of these activities are concerned with the development of good working relationships between indigenous military forces and their own people or with establishing and fostering such relationships between US Armed forces and local population (Ref 64, pp 7-10).

In Vietnam there are two wars. As noted, they are the war of violence and the war of nonviolence. Both have the same objective -- the defeat of the Viet Cong insurgency and the political preservation of the Republic of South Vietnam. The officers and men of the United States Army may find themselves under fire in combat with a determined and vicious enemy, or performing nonviolent civil affairs or civic actions. US Army infantry divisions and a cavalry (airmobile) division are engaged in search and destroy or clear and hold combat missions. These units are both attacking Viet Cong regular troops and waging counterinsurgency tactics against guerrilla bands. In addition, they are at all times subject to terroristic attacks by Viet Cong infiltrators.

The civil affairs and civic action programs being conducted concurrently with the military operations are supported by civil affairs units deployed to Vietnam (see Fig 11). The following extract gives more specific details:

The 41st and 29th Civil Affairs Companies now support US forces in Vietnam. The 41st is attached to Field Force I, operating in the Vietnamese II corps area, while the 29th supports the III Marine Amphibious Forces in the Vietnamese I Corps area. Both units were tailored for the job. As an example, the 41st CA Company contains, in addition to other functional specialists teams, 16 specially organized six-man teams to support refugee relief operations throughout Vietnam. These teams work in close coordination with the Agency for International Development (AID), volunteer relief organizations, local officials, as well as the US military forces.

Most civic action teams operate in fields of construction, engineering, health, and sanitation. Others have been provided in agriculture, food processing, water resources development, communications, resettlement, vocational training, literacy training, and transportation, to name but a few (Ref 64, pp 7-10).

In the June 1965 issue of the Military Review, Lieutenant Colonel Gustav J. Gillert, Jr., wrote in the following vein:

It would seem profitless at this late date in our counterinsurgency experience to extend anything but passing reference to the fact that insurgency and, consequently, counterinsurgency transcends military effort and entails total government application.



Figure 11. Medical Civic Action by United States Army Special Forces in Vietnam, 1967

Nevertheless, before proceeding, I feel obliged to acknowledge and to emphasize the paramount political, economic, sociological, and psychological considerations inherent in this type of conflict. We can search for counterinsurgency technological breakthroughs and attempt to computerize the insurgent threat, but no matter how complicated or exhausting our appraisal of each specific insurgent situation may be, in the final analysis we are engaged in a struggle for the mind of man. This is the first constant. It is a keystone of success when interwoven with the corollary constant - the necessity to provide the people with physical and psychological protection against subversive violence (Ref 65, pp 9-16).

The author of this quotation has noted the importance of our counterinsurgency experience up to 1965. His trenchant comments are valuable to this study because they show how nonviolent military activities fit into the spectrum of counterinsurgency. Further, he indicates the paramount importance of the political, economic, sociological, and psychological factors identified with counterinsurgency. By implication, he is saying that the individuals who are involved in counterinsurgency must be acquainted with these vital considerations. Further, inasmuch as United States Army officers and men are the principal agents of the government in the implementation of a counterinsurgency campaign, they must be informed in regard to the nonviolent factors noted above.

President Johnson emphasized the place of civic action in Vietnam when he said:

Men ask if we rely on guns alone. Still again the answer is No. From our Honolulu meeting, from the clear pledge which joins us with our allies in Saigon, there has emerged a common dedication to the peaceful progress of the people of Vietnam - to schools for their children, to care for their health, to hope and bounty for their land... As a nation we must magnify our struggle against world hunger and illiteracy and disease... (President Johnson, upon receiving the National Freedom Award, 23 February 1966).

In order to take up the slack in intercultural training and indoctrination, special courses have been organized, such as The Military Assistance Institute in Arlington, Va., and the Military Assistance Training Advisors Courses at Fort Bragg, N.C. These short courses are vital adjuncts to the military educational system of the United States armed forces. The Civil Affairs School at Fort Gordon, Georgia conducts a comprehensive and full-time military civil affairs/civic action training program. At the Civil Affairs School about 150 students annually, both US Army and Allied officers and men, have been given training to weld them together to form civil-military teams capable of functioning in cold war duty (Ref 66, p. 97).

Carrying on in the civil affairs tradition of World War II, the US Army began the training of military personnel in civic action at the US Army Civil Affairs School at Fort Gordon, Georgia. The course, which constitutes the principal schooling in this subject in the military establishment, is open to all officers of the military forces. In addition, various governmental agencies and allied nations send selected students to attend the course. Graduates are qualified professionally to serve as civil affairs or civic action staff officers (Ref 67).

In Vietnam, as elsewhere, civic action takes the forms of activity as follows: advice, supplies, facilities, services, and relationship. These areas of civic action are not easy to limit in their scopes. As it is not the purpose of this study to define the role of civic action, this listing is given primarily for general information. Military Civic Action is defined as:

Military civic action: The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population (Ref 68).

Obviously, all officers and men sent to Vietnam cannot be graduates of courses in civil affairs/civic action. As always in our military history, the American soldier possesses skills other than that of delivery of violence. As previously noted, the rank and file of the United States Army carry with them certain occupational civilian skills and individual talents which have been used for nonmilitary purposes. These attributes are most valuable to the military service but they cannot be counted upon absolutely. Therefore, the professional and temporary soldier must be educated, trained, and indoctrinated in the nonviolent aspects of modern warfare.

Initially, the United States Army personnel were used as advisors at the various military unit, political division, and subdivision levels. As additional troop units were deployed to Vietnam, the units themselves became involved in civic actions in their contiguous areas.

Civil action has many names. "Helping Hand" is a project started by members of the 25th Infantry Division. "Operation Christmas Star" was carried out by members of the 1st Logistical Command, unloading planes winging in relief supplies daily to the Republic of Vietnam from the United States.

Every American serviceman in Vietnam shares in and is aware of the importance of assisting the needy and orphaned of the country. The soldier's success as helper, builder and provider is measured in human terms by the recipients - the sick, the hungry, the homeless.

It is no accident that those who benefit most from this generosity and selflessness are the children. Where ever Americans have gone a spirit of spontaneous camaraderie is evident (Ref 64, pp 41-43).

As in Cuba and the Philippines in 1898-1905, the primary civic task in Vietnam is one which concerns sanitation and health. The resettlement of thousands of refugees, and the removal of populations to prevent their support of the Viet Cong are also nonmilitary projects. Before 1962 all these nonmilitary functions were performed by military personnel, although few of the officers and men so engaged were graduates of civil affairs or civic action courses.

The civic action activity, especially when performed by a combat unit, can become more than the organization can handle properly and still continue on its combat mission. In Vietnam the following policy obtains:

When the civil affairs function becomes more bothersome to the commander than is acceptable in terms of his other responsibilities, he may require individual civil affairs specialists, teams or entire tailored civil affairs units to assist him. Such is the case in Vietnam (Ref 64, p 8).

The importance of civil affairs/ civic action in the United States Army is shown today by the fact of assignment of:

... Civil Affairs staff elements in most division and higher level headquarters. In Vietnam brigades are authorized Civil Affairs staff sections. Battalion level units have often found it necessary to assign additional civil affairs/ civic action duties to battalion staff officers. Most combat battalions recommend an S-5 or civil affairs augmentation to the battalion staff (Ref 64, p 8).

In the above extract mention is made of the fact that it is often necessary to assign civil affairs/ civic action duties to battalion staff officers as an additional duty. This situation points up the requirement that all officers must receive some training in this nonviolent area of the military profession.

The Chief of Staff of the United States Army, General Harold K. Johnson, has noted the progress made in Vietnam during the year 1966. His commentary chiefly dwells on the achievements of combat. However, he points up the impact of the noncombat activities upon the overall Vietnam military operation. Of especial interest to this study are these comments:

Our combat operations are designed to seek and destroy an enemy who would enslave a whole people; all our activities in Vietnam consider the need for protecting and assisting the civilian population in order that their duly constituted government may function in their behalf. We have gained a far greater appreciation

of the value of psychological operations in a counter-insurgency environment and have employed many psychological operations units and troops in this role. Also, because of their unique capability to work with minority groups in remote areas, we have increased our Special Forces units in Vietnam (Ref 69, pp 37-40).

In further extension of his comments, General Johnson outlines the mission of civic action as carried out by advisors and by combat units. Schools, roads, bridges, and water supplies are all within the scope of the nonmilitary activities of the Army in Vietnam. On a more individual and personal basis is the work of the medical and dental services carried on by the Medical Corps of the Army as civil affairs/civic action. Of considerable importance is the care of refugees and their evacuation from the combat areas. Similar activity is the instruction in the English language, which is important for intercultural communication; its military value is obvious. A most unusual assignment for military officers is noted by the Chief of Staff in the detailing of twenty Army officers as agricultural advisors with the US Agency for International Development. Many other nation-building tasks are being undertaken by Army personnel in Vietnam (Ref 69, pp 37-40).

The value of the nonmilitary activities in Vietnam is not difficult to assess. In addition to actual relief of suffering and want among the people of South Vietnam, they serve to bring the American image into proper focus at rice paddy and village level. As most authorities agree that the war will be won or lost on these levels, civic action is proving to be a most effective weapon against the propaganda of the Viet Cong. The Chief of Staff sums it up in the following comment:

To the American soldier, providing personal help to the innocent sufferer comes naturally. Our men are spontaneous donors of kindness - they excel in the gentle chores which we call civic action, as they do in their combat roles. The magnificent performance of our troops remains the bed rock upon which our success has been built. The valor, the fighting spirit, and the compassion of our soldiers are visible daily in all parts of the Republic of Vietnam. Under conditions as arduous as those in any prior battles in our past, the American soldier in action today continues a tradition of bravery and compassion in the preservation of freedom (Ref 69, pp 37-40).

APPENDIX A

TASK ASSIGNMENT

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CDCRE-O

AMENDED COPY

12 April 1966

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, CORG

SUBJECT: Task Assignment No. 7

1. The Commanding General requests you to perform a study within the scope of work of Project Number Three of your contract for Calendar Year 1966.
2. TITLE: Political Education Requirements for US Army Personnel Engaged in Stability Operations.
3. STATEMENT OF WORK: Determine the means required to train and maintain the proficiency of the US Army in the political aspects of counterinsurgency.
 - a. Analyze the systems of education that have been employed historically and that are presently being employed to instill, in an Army, an understanding of those aspects of low intensity conflicts which may be broadly referred to as political in nature.
 - b. Analyze the existing US Army educational system in terms of the quantity and quality of information that it provides on the political aspects of low intensity conflicts. Attention will be devoted to both officer and enlisted training in career and specialty schools and in operational orientation.
 - c. Determine the extent of political knowledge required with the US Army for stability operations. This should include but not be limited to knowledge of: the basic factors that contribute to insurgency development, the patterns of evolution of insurgency (subversive and non-subversive), US political systems, and US foreign policy and organization. Requirements should be defined for specific officer and enlisted grade levels.
 - d. Analyze the education and organizational requirements necessary to impart and maintain this knowledge in the US Army.

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SUBJECT: Task Assignment No. 7

4. WHY IS WORK REQUIRED:

a. Close relationship between the military and non-military aspects of internal defense (See CDC letter dtd 1 Mar 66, subj: "New and Revised Terminology, ") and the dominant role of the political factor therein make it mandatory that the US Army maintain a proficiency in this field.

b. Operational experience gathered to date indicates that the extent and nature of political education in the US Army at present is inadequate to prepare personnel for problems to be faced in the field.

5. RESULTS ANTICIPATED: This study will produce recommendations concerning measures to be adopted to best improve the US Army's capabilities, including:

a. Qualitative statement of subject matter to be covered.

b. Quantitative statement of allocation of emphasis on various subjects.

c. Recommendations for instructional material.

d. Recommendations for the organization of US Army educational systems to effect the proposed educational innovations.

6. The study will be presented to the Commanding General in the form of a CORG publication entitled Annex 2, Project 3.

7. GUIDANCE.

a. References:

(1) USACDC SWCAG Doctrinal Review Program.

b. Administration:

(1) Direct coordination with RAC, SORO, USCONARC and subordinate agencies of USACDC is authorized.

(2) A final draft report will be completed by 30 June 1967.

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SUBJECT: Task Assignment No. 7

8. Correlation: This project is identified as USACDC Action Control Number 7291 and supports the following:

- | | |
|---|---|
| a. Army Concept Program | Army 70 |
| b. Study "Analysis and Development of US Counterinsurgency Doctrine and Organization;" USACDC Action Control Number | 3162 |
| c. Army Tasks | 3: Low Intensity Conflict Type I
4: Low Intensity Conflict Type II |
| d. Phase | Evaluation |
| e. Functions | Intelligence
Command, Control and Communication
Service Support |

9. It is requested that you analyze your resources, indicate your acceptance and/or recommendations, and provide the following information:

- a. Estimated man-months.
- b. Computer time.
- c. Proposed Completion Date.
- d. Project Officer.
- e. CORG Project Number.
- f. Type of publication.

JOHN T. PIERCE, III
Colonel, GS
Chief, Operations Research
Support Division

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APPENDIX B

NONMILITARY ACTIVITIES OF THE ARMY

Extract from Our Military History - Its Facts and Fallacies, by Major General Leonard Wood - USA Chief of Staff (1910-1914) (Ref 45).

Our people as a whole do not understand what a tremendous factor our little army has been in the building up of the nation and the development of its resources from the earliest days. They too often think of it only as an instrument of destruction. As a matter of fact it has been one of the great influences in opening up and building up the country and maintaining public order. Of recent years it has played a very great role as an administrative force, and in areas under its control great advances have been made and lasting benefits to humanity secured.

Before and after the Civil War the Army was the main instrument in the maintenance of order, the safeguarding of life and in the opening up and protection of lines of communication incident to the development of the West. This period of the army's activity was full of fascinating interest; it was attended by much hard and dangerous work. Even to this day the strongest hold the army has upon the affections of our western people is the result of the work of this period.

At the outbreak of the Spanish War the army entered upon a new field of activity. The war with Spain was not a great war. Fighting was limited to a few hotly-contested actions in Cuba and to some of lesser importance in Puerto Rico. Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities the army was confronted with the necessity of taking over the civil administration of the conquered territory. This administration was conducted under the broad authority of military law, but the agency employed was the law of the land. It was military for the time being, in that its source of authority was the power of the military occupant. Some deviations in form of procedure, due to emergency measures, were required, but, generally speaking, the municipal law governed in the town and city, and the general law of the land in the administration of justice and the control of administrative procedure. The basic policy was to avoid changes in the substantive body of the law, and to limit, as far as possible, modifications to procedure, with a view to its betterment and simplification, and also to giving the accused a larger measure of protection.

The administrative work in Cuba not only involved the everyday conduct of public business, but an immense amount of constructive work incident to the establishment of a school system, construction of great public works, and of the general laws governing charitable institutions, as well as an enormous amount of sanitary organization, an electoral law and constructive and administrative work to bring about the many changes necessary to convert a war-wrecked, demoralized and exhausted colony, fever-stricken and overrun by disease, into a self-governing republic.

This great work of the army involved not only the maintenance of public order and the safeguarding of life and property, but, what was more far reaching, the building up of a sound system of sanitation, a system which, when once in operation, greatly reduced the death rate. Malaria, in its various forms, had been one of the great causes of death in Cuba. Measures were taken which very greatly reduced its ravages among the native population and almost eliminating it from the army. Smallpox had been a devastating scourge. This was done away with entirely by vaccination and the establishment of proper regulations. Yellow fever, one of the most dreaded of all tropical diseases, was brought under thorough control, the means of transmission discovered, and the method of control worked out. This discovery freed Cuba of the dread disease which has swept away countless thousands of its population and decimated the Spanish garrisons and the Spanish population for generations. It is a discovery of vast importance for all time to all living in the American tropical and semi-tropical countries. Its accomplishment was the work of medical officers of the army under the direction of Major Walter Reed. The general sanitary work in the Island was under the control of an army medical officer who was directly under the military governor. Cuban physicians of great ability co-operated loyally in the great work of the sanitary rehabilitation and rendered invaluable service. The discoveries made in Cuba and the methods established for the control of yellow fever were adopted by other countries and the benefits secured are now common to all countries formerly ravaged by this disease. The saving of life and money in our own country incident to doing away with yellow fever and the quarantine that paralyzed the movement of business in the entire South, has been many, many times the cost of the war.

In Puerto Rico similar work was done with reference to malaria and smallpox. The same methods were applied

as were employed in Cuba to control yellow fever. The great problem of tropical anemia was taken up and solved. A very great portion of the credit for this work is due to the army, principally to Major Bailey K. Ashford, army surgeon, who took up the work in Puerto Rico and found that there was a real cause for what we looked upon as tropical shiftlessness and laziness. The cause was the hookworm. Most energetic and successful measures were taken to combat it. Recent opinion is to the effect that the re-energization of the working class in Puerto Rico incident to doing away with tropical anemia or hookworm disease, amounts to about 60 percent increased efficiency. The benefits of this discovery are being applied to many tropical and semi-tropical countries, including our own South. It means the re-energization of a great mass of people. The life-saving value is tremendous. Each year in Puerto Rico the reduction in the death rate incident to the control of tropical anemia, exceeds the total loss by death and wounds in the Spanish-American War. Important constructive and administrative work was also accomplished during the period of military control, much of it directly under the military governors who were first appointed.

Similar work, administrative, constructive, and sanitary, was accomplished in the Philippines. There for a long time the government was under exclusive military control. Much valuable and far-reaching sanitary work was done in those islands by medical officers of the army. This work has been taken up and continued by the medical forces of the civil government and pushed to a degree of success hard to appreciate by those who have not seen what has been done. It has been a great work, resulting in the saving of thousands and thousands of lives.

The construction of the Panama Canal was largely army work. It was built very largely on a sanitary foundation. Splendid and effective as has been the work of the army engineers, the frightful death toll would have prevented the accomplishment of the undertaking had it not been for Reed's discovery concerning yellow fever and the splendid application of the system of prevention by Surgeon-General William C. Gorgas, who made it possible to conduct the gigantic work of construction under conditions--so far as health was concerned--equal to those existing in almost any portion of the continental United States. These great sanitary works in lands under our control or taken over by us alone have saved many times the number of lives lost in

the war. The benefits of these discoveries will be for all time.

More recently other measures of the greatest value in saving human life have been taken by the military authorities of the government in the use of the anti-typhoid serum in the army; so effective has the serum been that although there are more than 100,000 men scattered all over the world from Tientsin, China, to Panama, and from Puerto Rico to Alaska, in the army we did not have a single death from typhoid in 1915.

The universal application of this preventive measure in the army has demonstrated thoroughly that typhoid fever can be completely controlled; that it is a preventable disease. Its universal application to the military establishment was first made in the United States. England first began the use of it, but did not make it general.

The army has done tremendous service for the country in the handling of the grave and alarming conditions arising from the great Mississippi flood of recent years. So quietly was this work done that few people appreciate it; thousands and thousands of people have been saved from watery graves or from starvation.

Such has been some of the constructive and life-saving work of the army. A force designed to protect our lives and liberties in time of war, in time of peace it has always been one of the great factors in the development of our own country and of lands under our control.

As has been pointed out again and again in the foregoing pages, the training which men get in the army, the knowledge of sanitation, the respect for law and authority, and the habits of discipline, are of unestimable value in building up a sane and sound people. How far-reaching its work has been is understood by few. It may at times fail, and in great emergency must fail unless backed and supported by an organized and devoted people, a people who appreciate that no amount of willingness can take the place of preparedness and training.

Behind the regular army must always stand the great reserve army consisting of the able-bodied men of the nation, so trained as to be promptly available for military service if needed, but following their normal occupations in time of peace.

Any policy which fails to recognize the principle of equal obligation and equal service is but a makeshift and

a stop-gap. The volunteer system is unworthy of serious consideration; not trustworthy because it would certainly break down under the sudden shock and strain of modern war; dangerous because it serves to lull people into a false sense of security.

APPENDIX C

THE PROFESSIONAL DEMANDS OF CIVIL AFFAIRS*

Extract from Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors, by Larry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg (Ref 54, pp 3-4).

The civil affairs officer must so govern as to help the combat forces but his work is also judged by non-military standards: ability to comply with the rules of international law; and, because military policy is but the instrument of national policy, by the ability to promote the nation's political interests. Civil affairs does not, like other phases of war, demand vast aggregations of men or (except for emergencies of civilian supply) of materials. But it does demand extraordinary intellectual and administrative skill in doing things, difficult enough in peacetime, under the conditions and special needs of war-time. The greatest difficulty is that most of the requisite skills of civil affairs are not those which the soldier acquires in his ordinary training and experience. They are political, economic, and technical skills - the skills of civilian more than military life. Moreover, even though the civil affairs officer does not make basic policy, these skills are not, in practice, merely executory. Because policy directives are often not entirely clear or leave considerable discretion, because there are many unforeseen exigencies which they do not cover, and because officials issuing the directives generally feel dependent upon the recommendations and information of people on the spot, civil affairs requires more than mere ability to follow orders. It demands, at least at higher levels, an understanding and sensitivity with regard to political and economic interests and the ability to sense what policy-makers would wish done about such interests under particular circumstances. In sum, when the soldier becomes governor he must transcend the limits of his knowledge, experience, and even values as a soldier; he must become, as best he can, something of a statesman.

*Civic action in the modern sense could be substituted for civil affairs - and the writer's thesis would be valid - today!

APPENDIX D

CIVILIAN CONSERVATION CORPS

The Civilian Conservation Corps was created by Congress on 31 March 1933, for the accomplishment of reforestation and other needful work throughout the country. The strength of the CCC was fixed initially at 250,000, but was later increased to 300,000.

Under the plan, as first outlined by the President, the Department of Labor was made responsible for selecting and certifying recruits, the War Department was charged with receiving certified applicants and organizing them into units, and the Departments of Interior and Agriculture were responsible for all other functions, including the establishment and maintenance of work camps and supervising forestry operations. On 10 April, however, the President made a major change in the original plan and directed the Army to assume, under the general supervision of the Director of the Civilian Conservation Corps, complete and permanent control of the CCC project, except for the functions of selecting recruits and supervising technical work in the forests. The immediate objective of the War Department became the assembly of approximately 300,000 men (more than were enlisted, incidentally, during the Spanish-American War), establishing them in a series of small camps in various and often isolated regions throughout the United States, and making adequate provision for their health, welfare, and maintenance. Figure 12 shows an Army officer and CCC enrollees on the job.

Obviously, hundreds of additional officers were required to administer what eventually became 1,450 camps, and to supervise the territorial districts into which the camps were grouped. To supplement available Regular personnel, the President authorized the use of a limited number of officers from the junior grades of the Officers Reserve Corps. Small contingents were also provided by the Navy and the Marine Corps.

On 1 July 1933, the War Department reported that the mobilization had been completed, that 1,315 camps had been established, and that CCC units had been organized and transported to the camps. The camps were officered by 3,641 officers of the Regular Army, Navy, and Marine Corps and 1,774 Reserve officers. The Regular officers were made available by ordering early graduation at service schools, by stripping Regular units, and by withdrawing officers from ROTC, ORC, and National Guard assignments. Authority was soon granted for calling additional Reserve officers to active duty with the CCC, and in due course they were able to relieve most of the Regular officers.

The Reserve officers on CCC duty gained valuable experience in practical leadership. They received no military training, but their administrative responsibilities developed executive ability, resourcefulness, and initiative, all of which were soon to stand them and the country in good stead.

There were 4,400 Reserve officers on duty with the CCC by the summer of 1934, and by August of 1935 this number had grown to 9,300 officers.




Figure 12. United States Army Officers Commanded Civilian Conservation Corps Camps
During the Depression of 1933-1936

Enrollment in the camps reached a maximum strength of 506,000 men in 1935; this strength dropped to approximately 350,000 men in April of 1936, thereby reducing the Reserve officers on CCC duty to 7,079.

A total of 3,088,184 men were enrolled in the Civilian Conservation Corps between April 1933 and June 1939, and 2,784,745 separations from all causes had taken place. This left 223,439 enrollees in the camps. At this time, there were 115 Regular Army officers, 4,617 Army Reserve officers, 131 Naval Reserve officers, 32 Marine Corps Reserve officers, and 60 warrant officers of the Coast Guard on CCC duty.

By direction of the President, the calling of additional Reserve officers to active duty with the CCC was suspended on 16 June 1939; they were to be replaced by civilian employees by 31 December 1939. Accordingly, all Reserve officers on CCC duty were relieved from active duty and placed on a civilian status by 31 December 1939. On 30 June 1941, there were 77 Regular Army officers and 3,189 members of the Reserve Corps on a civilian status (including 24 Naval Reserve officers, 12 Marine Corps officers, and one Coast Guard warrant officer) on duty with the CCC. Some 27 CCC companies were then assisting in the expanding national defense program by clearing and developing maneuver and training areas at various military reservations. The CCC was suspended in 1942.

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